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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Outline of Surveys and Paper 
This paper describes and analyzes the results of a survey of views of large businesses 
regarding recent UK Government initiatives aimed at modifying taxpayer behaviour 
and tackling what is perceived by the tax authorities acting on behalf of Government 
to be unacceptable/aggressive avoidance. 
Specifically, this paper examines the views of tax directors obtained from face-to-face 
interviews conducted in the spring of 2008 with representatives of 30 corporate 
groups (comprising FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and unlisted companies) regarding 
alternative approaches to tax risk and tax avoidance. This survey will be referred to as 
the Main Survey. The paper first describes the experiences and opinions of large 
business representatives with respect to the Risk Rating Approach, a key feature of 
the Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) links with large business programme 
(Varney Review),1 as well as the status of relationships between HMRC and large 
business more generally. The questions focus on the workings of the Large Business 
Service (LBS), which manages the affairs of the largest UK businesses.2 It next 
considers the respondents’ views on the practical implications of two developing 
legislative approaches – targeted anti-avoidance rules (TAARs) and principles-based 
legislation (PBL) – and how these approaches impact upon and are influenced by 
relationships between HMRC and large businesses. This work builds upon the 
authors’ earlier pilot survey regarding the Varney Review, conducted in spring 2007 
                                                 
∗ Judith Freedman is Professor of Tax Law, Oxford University, and Director of Legal Research at the 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation. Geoffrey Loomer is a Research Fellow and DPhil 
Student, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation. John Vella is Norton Rose Career 
Development Fellow in Company Law, Oxford University. 
1 For the HMRC publications setting out the details of this programme see Review of Links with Large 
Business (HMRC, November 2006) (‘Varney Report’); Making a Difference: Delivering the Review of 
Links with Large Business (HMRC, March 2007) (‘Varney Delivery Plan’); HMRC Approach to 
Compliance Risk Management for Large Business (HMRC, March 2007) (‘Risk Management Report’). 
2 The LBS deals with the affairs of around 700 companies, based on factors including turnover, assets 
threshold, and sector. There is some flexibility as to inclusion depending on a variety of circumstances. 
(Source: interview with LBS senior official).  
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(the Pilot Survey).3 The methodology employed in the Main Survey is described 
further in Appendix I. 
Brief reference is also made to work commissioned by HMRC resulting in two pieces 
of research carried out in 2007 by independent firms on the experience of large 
business customers, including on key aspects of the Varney Review. Summary results 
were published in January 2008,4 and a full report on one of the two pieces of 
research was published in July 2008 (after the Main Survey interviews had been
5
 
completed).   
1.2 The Context for the Survey 
ed on behalf of tax 
authorities, defines aggressive tax planning in a distinctive way. 
nd sold and the time revenue bodies discover them and remedial legislation 
 enacted.  
reas of law (sometimes, 
venue bodies would not even agree that the law is in doubt).  
                                                
The problem of drawing a boundary between tax planning and tax avoidance, or what 
is sometimes termed ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ (or ‘aggressive’) taxpayer 
behaviour, is one that besets all tax jurisdictions. It raises fundamental questions about 
the nature of tax legislation and the relationships between taxpayers, intermediaries, 
the administration, the courts, and government. The notion of ‘aggressive’ tax 
planning has now been introduced into the international tax lexicon by the OECD 
Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries, a study which went considerably further 
than its title suggests in attempting to form the basis for an international approach to 
the control of taxpayer behaviour.6 The OECD study, prepar
Planning involving a tax position that is tenable but has unintended and 
unexpected tax revenue consequences. Revenue bodies’ concerns relate to the risk 
that tax legislation can be misused to achieve results which were not foreseen by the 
legislators. This is exacerbated by the often lengthy period between the time schemes 
are created a
is
 
Taking a tax position that is favourable to the taxpayer without openly disclosing 
that there is uncertainty whether significant matters in the tax return accord with 
the law. Revenue bodies’ concerns relate to the risk that taxpayers will not disclose 
their view on the uncertainty or risk taken in relation to grey a
re
 
This aggressive tax planning concept generally, and this definition specifically, are, 
however, highly contentious. Other commentators would argue that the fact that the 
tax revenue consequences of a transaction are not those that the revenue authorities 
expected does not mean that they are not those that the legislature acting as a body 
expected and, moreover, that the test of whether tax planning is ‘acceptable’ should be 
 
3 For a summary see J Freedman, G Loomer and J Vella, ‘Moving Beyond Avoidance? Tax Risk and 
the Relationship between Large Business and HMRC’ in J Freedman (ed), Beyond Boundaries: 
Developing Approaches to Tax Avoidance and Tax Risk Management (Centre for Business Taxation, 
2008) (‘Beyond Boundaries’). For the full report see 
<http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/Tax/publications/reports/Reports.htm> (‘Pilot Survey Full Report’). 
4 HMRC, Update on Review of Links with Large Business: research summary (January 2008), available 
at <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/large-business/lb-summary.pdf>. 
5 HMRC Research Report 58, Research to support the implementation of proposals in the Review of 
Links with Large Business (December 2007) (‘HMRC Research Report 58’), available at 
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/research/report58.pdf>.  
6 OECD Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries (OECD, 2008), available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/34/39882938.pdf>. 
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what the legislation says as interpreted by the courts and not what the tax authorities 
suppose it was intended to say. This raises very difficult issues of parliamentary 
intention, the role of legislators, the courts and the administration, and also the rights 
and duties of taxpayers and their advisers (the ‘intermediaries’ of the title of the 
study). These issues cannot be fully explored in this paper but the results of this 
survey will be used in future work as a basis for further examination of these 
questions.7 
nd trust, with both parties 
going beyond their statutory obligations (authors’ italics).8 
e 
agement of what 
ey term ‘tax risk’ in large corporates. HMRC define tax risk as: 
 
are correct which may lead to an issue being identified.  
(authors’ italics) 
assessing its behaviour.11 The words ‘right’ and ‘correct’ in the above quote may be 
                                                
One of the conclusions of the OECD study is that, in order to encourage disclosure by 
taxpayers, revenue authorities need to have effective risk management processes in 
place. If they do so, the study contends, this should encourage large corporate 
taxpayers to engage in a relationship based on cooperation a
In the UK, even before the OECD study was commenced, a similar approach had 
been adopted in the Varney Review. The core team working on the OECD study was 
supplied by the UK HMRC so the co-incidence in the approaches is no surprise.9 Th
UK authorities are now taking a two-pronged approach to the man
th
a risk that a customer will not pay the right amount of tax or duty at the right 
time … 
A tax compliance risk may be an identified tax issue, where HMRC and the 
customer may not agree about a particular tax analysis set out in a return or 
declaration. Or it may be a less specific uncertainty about whether tax returns 
and declarations 10
The first prong of this approach is to work towards an enhanced relationship based on 
trust and co-operation, enabling the revenue authorities to direct their limited 
resources to the areas where they are most needed. The revenue authorities appear to 
hope this will encourage the corporate taxpayer to look beyond its legal obligations in 
 
7 For references to some of this literature see J Freedman, ‘Interpreting Tax Statutes: Tax Avoidance 
and the Intention of Parliament’ (2007) 123 LQR 53; R Avi-Yonah, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Strategic Tax Behaviour’ in W Schön (ed), Tax and Corporate Governance (Springer, 2008); R 
Avi-Yonah, ‘Aggressive Tax Behaviour and Corporate Social Responsibility’ in Beyond Boundaries (n 
3 above); R Fraser, ‘“Aggressive Tax Behaviour” and Corporate Social Responsibility: A Response’ in 
Beyond Boundaries (n 3 above). 
8 See L Wise, ‘OECD Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries’ in Beyond Boundaries (n 3  above).  
9 The OECD study reports that other countries that have developed business models aimed at 
improving the tax system through greater co-operation include Ireland, the Netherlands and the USA. 
Their experiences are set out in more detail at Annex 8.1 of that study. 
10 HMRC, Tax compliance risk management: Guidance for LBS customers and staff (December 2007) 
(‘December 2007 Guidance’) p 5, available at <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/large-business/risk-
framework-guidance.pdf>. 
11 For example, the December 2007 Guidance states that its assessment of a company’s risk rating will 
take account of whether innovative tax planning is undertaken that relies on a new analysis of 
legislation or an analysis of new legislation that is not clearly agreed in published policy objectives or 
HMRC guidance, or existing analysis of legislation, but in circumstances producing a more 
advantageous tax outcome than previously applied. Note that a taxpayer relying on high level advice on 
the meaning of the legislation might thus still be assessed as high risk under this definition if this 
advice does not concur with the HMRC view. In assessing a company’s risk rating HMRC will ask: 
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problematic and this provides important background to this exercise. It is now widely 
agreed that companies will assess reputational risk, which arguably might in some 
cases take them beyond their legal taxpaying duties, but attitudes to reputational risk 
vary considerably as do the views of company directors and managers on the extent to 
which their taxpaying behaviour should be governed by considerations which extend 
wider than reputational risk.12 This survey examines the views of corporate tax 
managers on these issues through the medium of a discussion of risk rating. In 
addition to being a resource allocation mechanism, risk rating attempts to create an 
incentive to taxpayers to aim for a low risk rating by moderating their behaviour. The 
survey investigated the value given to the benefits of being low risk and the extent to 
which company managers and directors were prepared to moderate behaviour in order 
to achieve the purported benefits, such as cost saving and reduced management time 
spent on tax affairs. 
At the same time the UK revenue authorities are attempting to improve the drafting of 
anti-avoidance legislation so that it is not necessary to rely on companies’ 
management going beyond their legal obligations. Using specific examples, this 
survey investigates these legislative initiatives and considers their chances of success 
in improving the understanding of all parties of what is required by the law.  
The two approaches described above are of course linked. Clearly if there is a strong 
chance that some tax planning will be found to be ineffective by the courts, the case 
for pursuing that planning approach is lessened as a matter of cost benefit analysis, 
which includes the question of reputational risk. 
As will be seen in this discussion, the survey results support this two-pronged 
approach. They do suggest, however, that it would be unwise to place too much 
reliance on large corporations going beyond their legal obligations. Both as a practical 
matter and as a question of the rule of law, the second approach is preferable so that 
there is no need to require corporate taxpayers to go beyond their legal obligations. 
There are concerns about the power of this second approach to clarify the 
requirements of the law, but there is considerable support for exploration of the use of 
these tools within a context of enhanced co-operation and trust achieved by the first 
approach. 
The recent spate of migrations of large, prominent companies out of the UK has 
shown how imperative it is that the approach to deal with tax risk and unacceptable 
tax planning is correctly calibrated. Increasingly companies are threatening to, and in 
some cases are actually, moving away from UK residence because they are unhappy 
with the tax system. Of course it is the task of HMRC and Parliament to carry out 
changes that are necessary or even useful to deal with tax risk and unacceptable tax 
planning but clearly any possible consequences must be weighed carefully; 
ascertaining the views of a range of company directors is valuable for this and other 
reasons as an aid to the formulation of effective and balanced tax policy. 
                                                                                                                                            
‘Are the customer’s judgments about the application of tax law generally consistent with HMRC’s 
views?’: ibid p 28. 
12  See the literature cited in n 7 above.  
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2 RISK RATING & THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HMRC 
AND LARGE BUSINESSES 
2.1 Background to the Risk Rating Approach 
The first part of this paper focuses on the Risk Rating Approach (RRA) and the 
relationship between HMRC and large businesses. This was first explored in the Pilot 
Survey and the issue was probed further in the Main Survey. 
In November 2006 HMRC launched the Varney Review as part of a drive to improve 
the relationship between HMRC and large businesses. One of the four desired 
outcomes of this review is ‘an efficient risk based approach to dealing with tax 
matters’.13 Under this Risk Rating Approach, each company within the LBS is 
awarded a risk rating, which determines the volume of HMRC’s interventions in the 
company’s affairs and the nature of the working relationship between the two. In 
essence, a light touch is adopted for low risk companies thus releasing resources that 
can be directed towards higher risk companies.14 Risk here is ‘compliance risk’, 
defined by HMRC as ‘the likelihood of failure to pay the right tax at the right time, or 
of not understanding what the right position might be.’15  
Initial implementation of the RRA for companies within the LBS was all but complete 
at the time of the interviews. In fact, in the 2008 Budget, HMRC reported that 97% of 
LBS customers had been risk reviewed using the new risk review template. The 
13,000 or so large businesses that do not fall within the LBS, known as ‘Local 
Compliance customers’, shall also benefit from the RRA. A risk strategy and 
guidance based on the LBS model is, in fact, currently being introduced.16  
The stated aim of the RRA is achieving a ‘more cost effective use of resources and 
efficient resolution of issues.’17 It is clear, however, that HMRC also view this 
approach as a means to incentivize companies to alter their behaviour in terms of 
transparency, governance, and tax planning. It can thus also be characterized, in part, 
as being an administrative route to deal with the problem of avoidance. For example, 
HMRC’s documentation speaks about having ‘encouraged businesses to consider their 
position by defining the benefits of being low risk’.18 Whilst HMRC thus aims to 
support companies in having a low risk relationship, since it is assumed that this is 
                                                 
13 Varney Report (n 1 above) para 1.7. See also para 1.6 and the Chairman’s forward at p 1. This 
approach is not entirely novel. The Varney Report in fact builds on the report Working with Large 
Business: Providing High Quality Service – Improving Tax Compliance (HMRC, April 2006) which, 
amongst other things, provided for a risk assessment process. In fact, it appears that HMRC carried out 
risk assessments even earlier than this.  
14 By basing its enforcement programme on risk assessment, HMRC are moving into line with the 
Government’s wider approach to better regulation, as recommended by the Hampton Review. Risk 
Management Report (n 1 above) para 1.6. See also P Hampton, Reducing Administrative Burdens: 
Effective Inspection and Enforcement (HM Treasury, March 2005). 
15 Risk Management Report (n 1 above) para 3.2. 
16 HMRC, The framework for a better relationship (Budget 2008) p 10 (‘2008 Framework’) available 
at <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2008/supplementary.htm>. 
17 Varney Report (n 1 above) p 16. 
18 2008 Framework (n 16 above) p 4. See also HMRC, Making a difference: Certainty and clarity 
(October 2007) p 11; Risk Management Report (n 1 above) para 1.4; Varney Delivery Plan (n 1 above) 
para 3.3 and p 16; 2008 Framework (n 16 above) p 10; December 2007 Guidance (n 10 above) pp 8, 16 
and 18.  
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what they want,19 it does not force their hands. Each company is free to choose where 
it positions itself on the risk rating spectrum. If it chooses to remain on the higher end 
it will simply forfeit the benefits of being low risk. 
The interviewees in the Pilot Survey agreed with the approach in principle, but a 
majority raised serious questions about its details and practical operation. The details 
of the approach, however, had not been fully developed at the time of that survey. In 
fact, detailed guidance was only published in December 2007.20 Furthermore, too 
little time had passed for the interviewees to fully appreciate the impact of the 
approach in practice. For the purposes of the Main Survey, therefore, the authors were 
interested in finding out whether the uncertainties on the details had been overcome 
and how the approach was translating into practice. 
2.2 Companies’ Risk Ratings 
Under the RRA, companies are given a risk rating on a number of criteria,21 as well as 
an overall rating. A high ranking official from the LBS explained to the authors22 that 
there are only two overall ratings a company can obtain – ‘low risk’ and ‘higher risk’, 
there being different gradations within the higher risk category. Out of the 9 
companies interviewed in the Pilot Survey only 1 was deemed low to moderate risk. 
The remainder were either in the higher risk end of the scale or had not yet had their 
risk assessment. In the Main Survey, the companies’ risk ratings were distributed 
more uniformly.  
A small number of the companies interviewed were, at the time, still to undergo a risk 
rating assessment. Out of those that have had a risk rating, some reported a single 
overall risk rating – and these were divided almost equally between low and higher 
risk. The rest merely said they obtained different ratings on the different criteria. 
However, they again split quite evenly between those that seemed to lie closer to the 
lower end of the spectrum and those that lie closer to the higher end. Thus the 
interviewees were spread quite evenly along the risk spectrum.23  
These findings are in line with HMRC’s expectation that by March 2008 nearly 40% 
of risk rated companies would be low risk.24 Interestingly, asked if they were 
surprised by this 40% figure, 13 of the 21 interviewees who answered this question 
said that they were not surprised. The risk rating of the particular company does not 
seem to have had an impact on the interviewees’ views on this figure. It is also 
interesting to note that all but one of the tax directors of FTSE 100 companies who 
were not surprised by the figure commented that many companies covered by the LBS 
                                                 
19 December 2007 Guidance (n 10 above) p 8. 
20 December 2007 Guidance (n 10 above). 
21 The criteria will be discussed below. 
22 Interview (n 2 above). 
23 4 companies had not had a risk rating assessment yet – all FTSE 250. 16 gave a single overall risk 
rating: 7 said they are low risk (4 FTSE 100, 2 FTSE 250, 1 unlisted); 2 said they are moderate risk 
(FTSE 250); 7 said they are high risk (FTSE 100). 10 did not give an overall risk rating. 2 of these said 
they are on the lower end of the scale (1 FTSE 100, 1 FTSE 250). 8 said they are low on some criteria 
and moderate or high on others. Out of these 8, 3 are clearly on the lower end of the spectrum and 
could possibly be overall low risk or there about (2 FTSE 100, 1 FTSE 250), whilst the remaining 5 
seem to be situated somewhere on the mid-high end of the scale, possible closer to the high end (FTSE 
100). 
24 2008 Framework (n 16 above) p 10. 
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are relatively ‘small’. There appears to be a belief amongst some of the Main Survey 
interviewees that there is a correlation between high risk and large, complex 
companies. This is despite the fact that HMRC claim that large, complex companies 
may be low risk25 and that even within the sample a number of large, complex 
companies are in fact low risk or on the lower end of the scale. It is the case that all 
those at the highest end of the scale in the sample26 are large and complex and are 
FTSE 100 companies. The sample is too small to provide conclusive evidence in this 
regard, but in view of the continuing belief of some firms that they are too large to be 
low risk, and the contrary HMRC assertion that very large complex firms may be low 
risk, it would be useful if HMRC could provide a breakdown of risk ratings by size of 
company. 
2.3 Risk Rating Criteria 
All the interviewees for the Pilot Survey agreed with the basic ideas behind the RRA, 
however, all but one had reservations about the detail, and its translation into 
practice.27 These reservations primarily concerned the risk assessment criteria and the 
benefits of being low risk. The three main reservations on the risk rating criteria were 
the nature of the criteria, the different weight to be given to the criteria, and the use of 
tax avoidance as a criterion; these were explored further in the Main Survey. 
2.3.1 The risk rating criteria and their weight 
The risk rating criteria can be divided into two general groups: structural or inherent 
and behavioural.28 Inherent risks include change, complexity and boundary issues. 
Behavioural risks include corporate governance, delivery, tax strategy and 
contribution.29  The Pilot Survey revealed some uncertainty as to whether it was the 
existence of inherent risk itself or its management that would be relevant in the risk 
rating process. Most of the interviewees assumed that it was the former.30 As their 
companies were large and complex they concluded that they could never be low risk 
thus making the risk rating process ‘irrelevant’.31  Furthermore, the Pilot Survey also 
revealed that there was considerable uncertainty as to the weight to be given to the 
various criteria. In particular, most of these interviewees were uncertain as to whether 
a company that did not have a low score on structural criteria could bring its overall 
rating down to low risk by having a low score on behavioural criteria.32 Thus the 
authors concluded that ‘further explanation is needed as to whether the existence of 
                                                 
25 December 2007 Guidance, explained further below. 
26 These include: (i) companies that are high risk (ii) companies which have different ratings on the 
different criteria, and, although the interviewers were not told their overall rating, they  believe them to 
be  closer to the high end of the scale. 
27 Pilot Survey Full Report (n 3 above) p 9. 
28 Risk Management Report (n 1 above) para 4.4 and Annex A. 
29 December 2007 Guidance (n 10 above) pp 6-7 and Annex C. ‘Contribution’ in this context is the tax 
paid in comparison with the amount HMRC might expect from the level of its economic activity and in 
comparison to its competitors. Obviously this comparison involves subjective judgments and could be 
contentious.  
 
30 Pilot Survey Full Report (n 3 above) p 9. 
31 ibid p 11.  
32 ibid p 10.  
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structural issues or their management will be taken into account, and thus whether 
companies of a certain size and complexity can ever become low risk.’33 
HMRC seem to have responded to these concerns. The December 2007 Guidance 
states: 
The ‘Inherent’ sources of compliance risk will not determine whether we have a 
low risk relationship with the customer.  What matters is how those risks are 
being managed and how they translate into the assessment of ‘behavioural’ 
ratings for governance, delivery and tax strategy (Annex C). A business with 
major inherent sources of risk can be seen by HMRC as low risk if, by its 
actions, it is minimising those risks and willing to be open about tax compliance 
and issues.34  
HMRC has thus shifted its emphasis onto behavioural factors or, at least, it has 
conveyed more clearly the message that behavioural factors carry more weight than 
inherent factors. A majority of the Main Survey interviewees seem to have recognised 
the change, and therefore that large complex companies could be low risk.35 Some 
interviewees expressly noted the evolution of the approach in this sense.36 Some 
interviewees were less clear in their answers on the risk rating criteria, simply noting 
that both structural and behavioural issues are important.37 The remaining few 
interviewees, however, seem yet to be convinced. These interviewees (six out of the 
22 who answered the question), all from large and complex companies, and all high 
risk or on the higher end of the scale, acknowledged that HMRC are now asserting 
that large complex multinationals can be low risk but remain sceptical. One simply 
pointed to the fact that the membership of the recently created High Risk Corporates 
Programme seems highly correlated to the upper end of the FTSE 100.  
Worryingly, 2 further interviewees believe large complex multinationals cannot be 
low risk because they were told so by HMRC staff. This brings to light a problem 
noted by other interviewees, namely that the change in attitude on the RRA has not 
fully filtered down from the top at HMRC. Apart from the need to ensure that 
everyone at HMRC is up to speed on the RRA, some interviewees also opined that 
despite the welcome evolution of the approach, there is still room for further 
improvement and refinement. In particular, a few interviewees believe that the criteria 
and the guidance give less room for flexibility and judgement than is desirable.  
Thus the shift in emphasis from structural to behavioural criteria was recognised by a 
majority of those interviewed. Some, however, have heard the rhetoric but remain 
unconvinced. Clearly large, complex multinationals can be low risk if their attitude to 
tax planning is one that fits the HMRC profile but it remains the case that most high 
risk companies are large, complex multinationals.  
                                                 
33 ibid p 11. See also p 17. 
34 December 2007 Guidance (n 10 above) p 7. See also p 11.  
35 12 out of the 22 interviewees who answered the question. 
36 7 out of the 22 interviewees who answered the question. 
37 2 out of the 22 interviewees who answered the question. 
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2.3.2 Tax strategy and risk rating 
2.3.2.1 Centrality of tax planning to risk rating 
As noted, one of the risk rating criteria is a company’s tax strategy. An important 
aspect of this criterion is a company’s attitude to tax planning and avoidance.38 If 
large, complex multinationals are to be low risk , as discussed above, then tax 
planning could be the most important risk rating criterion in a considerable number, if 
not a majority, of cases. These large companies can never be fully low risk on 
inherent factors, so they can only bring down their overall rating by becoming low 
risk on behavioural factors. None of the interviewees said that they want to be 
anything other than low risk on corporate governance and delivery. Indeed, becoming 
transparent and open and putting good systems in place seem to be aspects of the 
Varney Review that most, if not all, the interviewees say they agree with and aspire 
to. It follows that if companies manage to bring down their risk rating on the other 
behavioural factors, their overall risk rating will depend on their attitude to tax 
planning. A number of interviewees provided direct support for this view. They want 
to be open and transparent, and have good governance systems in place, but, even 
though they know that they could reduce their risk rating by altering their tax planning 
behaviour, they are resolutely unwilling to do so. This is particularly so when 
HMRC’s view that a piece of tax planning is ‘unacceptable’ is based on an 
interpretation of the law which they feel they are entitled to disagree with, pending 
determination by the courts.39 Further evidence for the centrality of tax planning to 
the RRA is that all the large, complex companies in the sample that are low risk seem 
to be conservative in their tax planning.  
                                                
2.3.2.2 Tax policies/strategies and board involvement  
Other factors taken into account when assessing the risk rating of a company on the 
tax strategy criterion are whether the strategy is documented, the extent to which tax 
planning is articulated in it, and the board’s awareness of it.40 Clearly, all this links 
with another of the seven risk rating criteria, namely, corporate governance.  
HMRC view a board approved tax policy as a feature of good governance.41 
Paragraph 3.2 of the Risk Management Report provides that a business that is 
successfully managing tax risk will have, inter alia, ‘strong governance, with a clear 
tax strategy and principles set by its Board, and well-defined accountabilities, roles 
and responsibilities that are understood throughout the business.’42 
A great majority of the Main Survey interviewees’ companies have a tax policy or a 
tax strategy,43 almost all approved by their Board. Only a few, most low risk, 
 
38 December 2007 Guidance (n 10 above) Annex C.  
39 Note that the research carried out on HMRC’s behalf found concern amongst participants regarding 
the use of tax planning as a risk rating criterion: HMRC Research Report 58 (n 5 above) p 26. 
40 December 2007 Guidance (n 10 above). 
41 See HMRC, Tax in the Boardroom, available at <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/lbo/tax-in-the-
boardroom.htm>. 
42 Risk Management Report (n 1 above) para 3.2. Schedule A includes these questions: ‘What are the 
reporting structures – what reports are required and made to the Board by the customer’s tax team? 
What are the relevant accountabilities?’  
43 28 answered this question: 10 have a tax policy; 11 have a tax strategy; 2 said that tax falls within the 
ambit of a broader risk policy. 
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companies have shared their policy or strategy with HMRC. The obvious benefit of 
drawing up a tax policy and not just a strategy is that it focuses the mind on how tax 
and tax risk is managed within a company. Some interviewees seemed to have a 
positive view of the impact of tax policies. On the other hand, as some interviewees 
noted, they can prove to be rather anodyne. Vague generalizations can make for a 
perfectly respectable tax policy of, one fears, very limited practical significance.  
HMRC have also been clear in saying that they have and will engage at Board level 
on tax issues. 
Where we believe that a customer’s behaviour poses a serious tax risk we will 
engage directly at Board level to try to persuade that customer to change the 
behaviours that are generating those risks.  A Board needs to be aware that 
contentious tax investigations and disputes are expensive and resource intensive. 
We will generally seek dialogue and offer a Board an alternative approach and 
will always support our customers in moving towards a low risk relationship.44 
A number of Main Survey interviewees discussed HMRC’s engagement with their 
Board or Board members.45 Given that a majority of the interviewees’ policies or 
strategies were board approved, and that a majority also said their board (or a board 
committee) is involved at some stage in the decision-making or review processes,46 it 
is unsurprising to find that nearly all the interviewees who discussed HMRC 
engagement at Board level were adamant that their boards or members thereof are at 
least broadly aware of the tax affairs of the company. Indeed, a few described the 
view that their Board might not be aware of the tax planning undertaken by their tax 
department as ‘naïve’. It should be noted, however, that one or two interviewees’ 
comments suggested that in their view Board engagement was not (or previously had 
not been) adequate in their companies.  
Whilst HMRC thus appear to view the Board of Directors as an organ that can keep 
tax planning in check, a few interviewees noted that it can have the opposite effect as 
a result of the so-called ‘golf course syndrome’. Directors hear about the tax planning 
carried out in other companies whilst socializing with other directors, or indeed, 
whilst acting as non-executive directors on the Boards of other companies, and thus 
become eager for their companies to enter into the same type of transactions. A cross-
fertilization of tax planning ideas can thus take place.  
The findings support the view that tax planning could be the most important risk 
rating criterion in a considerable number of cases. Tax policies and strategies are 
common, but the former can often be too vague and general to have much practical 
significance. All but one of the high risk companies interviewed in the Main Survey 
have a tax policy/strategy.47 Also, all but one of these companies claimed to have 
formal or informal decision-making/review processes which involve the board or 
                                                 
44 December 2007 Guidance (n 10 above) p 16. See also 2008 Framework (n 16 above) p 10. 
45 This issue was discussed with 18 of the interviewees. 
46 All the interviewees in the Pilot Survey already had board participation in the decision-making or 
review processes. In this year’s survey this matter was only mentioned fleetingly by the interviewees 
whilst discussing their tax policies/strategies.  
47 Tax planning falls within the ambit of a more general code of conduct/risk policy for this one 
company. Note that one of the companies said that its policy was unwritten and informal.  
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board members.48 Since these companies do not seem to be overly conservative in 
their tax planning, the Main Survey shows that companies engaging in non-
conservative tax planning may nevertheless have corporate governance procedures in 
relation to tax matters.49 The Main Survey, however, did not investigate the adequacy 
and robustness of such processes, in particular the ones of an informal nature. 
2.3.3 Benefits of being low risk 
HMRC set out the consequences of being low risk in the Risk Management Report, 
particularly in Chapter 5, and again in considerable detail in the December 2007 
Guidance. In essence, low risk companies are to benefit from a light touch approach, 
whilst higher risk companies will be the subject of ‘more intensive scrutiny’.50  
A majority of the interviewees in the Pilot Survey could not see the benefits of being 
low as opposed to high risk. Some noted that low risk companies are meant to enjoy a 
light touch approach but were sceptical about that happening in practice. They thought 
that the size and complexity of certain companies necessitated constant audit reviews 
and regular interventions, whatever their risk rating may be. On the other hand, these 
interviewees had no difficulty identifying a particular negative of being high risk: 
being ‘hassled’ by HMRC, especially by asking for a lot of information.  
In contrast, 13 of the 25 interviewees who answered this question in the Main Survey 
could see the benefits of being low risk. These included being subject to fewer 
enquiries, obtaining formal and informal clearances with greater ease, being 
approached by HMRC with a less suspicious frame of mind, a real time working 
relationship, and a quicker resolution of disputes. Only two of the 25 who answered 
this question said that they are unclear as to what the benefits of being low risk are. 
The remaining 10 were aware of the benefits, but do not think they suffice to induce 
them to alter their tax planning behaviour and thus become low risk. Some of these 
interviewees said that the benefits are ‘intangible’; others said that they could be 
tangible but still would not justify altering their behaviour. All of these interviewees 
were higher risk rated apart from one, whose company is still to be risk rated. They 
believe that ultimately one has to weigh the costs against the benefits of becoming 
low risk. If the benefits do not outweigh the costs then they will not undertake the 
necessary changes to become low risk. Thus the results of the Main Survey suggest 
strongly that some companies will never view the benefits of being low risk as 
sufficient to justify a change in tax planning behaviour. This, as shall be discussed 
further on, has repercussions for the fulfillment of some of the goals of the RRA. 
2.4 Relationship with HMRC 
The RRA is, as mentioned, one of the desired outcomes of the Varney Review, the 
other three being certainty, speedy resolution of issues, and clarity through 
consultation. All four contribute to the ultimate aim of the Varney Review, which is 
that of improving the relationship between HMRC and large business, and one cannot 
really assess the effect of one without at least considering the others.  
                                                 
48 The decision-making and review processes were not discussed with this company, so it could, in fact, 
have such processes in place.  
49 On this point see HMRC Research Report 58 (n 5 above) p 26. 
50 Risk Management Report (n 1 above) para 1.10. 
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One of the most positive findings of the Main Survey is that most of the interviewees 
said that they either enjoy a good relationship with HMRC or that the relationship 
between the two has improved recently.51 Interviewees from both low and higher risk 
companies noted an improvement in the openness of the relationship, in the speed 
with which issues are resolved, and in the focus on the more important issues.52 
The focus on important issues, in particular, marks a clear difference from the past. 
Interviewees in the Pilot Survey had complained, in fact, about the ‘hassle factor’, i.e. 
that HMRC was often indiscriminate, demanding voluminous documentation in areas 
where the risk was low and perhaps the amount of tax in question was low too. In the 
Main Survey both low and higher risk companies commented on an improvement in 
this respect. This is, of course, to be expected for low risk companies; however, as 
noted, HMRC is committed to speedier resolution and focusing its interventions on 
areas of significant risk even for higher risk companies.53 In fact, speedy resolution of 
issues is, as noted, one of the four desired outcomes of the Varney Review, and 
proposals have been put in place for its attainment. It is clearly linked to the RRA in 
as much as it is partly based on and made possible by an allocation of resource 
according to risk.  
The relationship between HMRC and large businesses thus seems to be moving in the 
right direction but there is a need for further work. Indeed, a few interviewees first 
noted the improvement then hastened to add that there is still some way to go. One 
interviewee commented that HMRC still tended to react aggressively when 
challenged. Another observed that whilst HMRC have been very good at dealing with 
small, less significant issues it remains to be seen how they act when dealing with the 
larger, more significant ones. A further comment was that whilst the tone of 
engagement between HMRC and companies has improved greatly, some elements 
within HMRC are still wedded to the antagonistic and aggressive culture of the past. 
A few interviewees noted, in particular, that former HM Customs and Excise staff still 
tend to be more aggressive than former Inland Revenue personnel.54  
It is interesting to note that interviewees from two of the three companies outside the 
LBS had a very negative view of their relationship with HMRC. There are too few 
interviewees in this category to draw any firm conclusions from this but it may 
suggest that there would be value in extending the Varney Review beyond the LBS, as 
indeed HMRC plan to do. 
                                                 
51 13 companies noted that the relationship has improved recently. 7 enjoy a good relationship. 
Interviewees were not asked directly whether their relationship with HMRC has improved or if they 
enjoy a good relationship with HMRC, so the actual figures could have been higher. One notes that the 
research carried out on behalf of HMRC found contrasting views about whether an open and 
transparent relationship with HMRC was a realistic goal. See HMRC Research Report 58 (n 5 above) p 
20.  
52 The last two noted improvements also relate to another of the four desired outcomes of the Varney 
Review, namely speedy resolution of issues: Varney Report (n 1 above) pp 18-19. The delivery of this 
desired outcome is detailed in 2008 Framework (n 16 above). 
53 December 2007 Guidance (n 10 above) Part 5 ‘Handling tax issues for all customers’. See also 
proposal 7 of the Varney Delivery Plan (n 1 above). 
54 The research carried out on behalf of HMRC found a perception of adversarial approaches by HMRC 
amongst participants. Recent improvements were also noted: HMRC Research Report 58 (n 5 above) 
pp 46-47. 
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Every company in the LBS is appointed a Customer Relationship Manager (CRM), 
who acts as a first point of contact with HMRC.55 A number of Main Survey 
interviewees expressly emphasized the importance of good quality CRMs if the 
relationship between HMRC and taxpayers is to improve and the Varney Review 
goals are to be obtained.56 The message put forward was unequivocal: good CRMs 
make a difference. Most interviewees who commented on their CRMs were 
complimentary, finding them competent and enjoying a good relationship with them. 
A few however, were less positive. Some complained that their CRM had been 
changed too often, thus making it difficult to nurture a good relationship. The 
interviews left no doubt whatsoever that a strong investment should be made in 
ensuring that the quality of CRMs and the resources available to them are high. This 
is essential if the whole project is to be a success. Consideration also needs to be 
given to the relationship developed between CRMs and taxpayers and the way in 
which this should be monitored and controlled. As with, for example, audit partners, 
there are potential advantages and disadvantages of a strong relationship.  
2.5 Evaluation of RRA and Conclusions 
The goals of the RRA are a more cost effective use of resources, a more efficient 
resolution of issues, and incentivizing companies to alter their behaviour in terms of 
transparency, governance, and tax planning. The results of the Main Survey support 
the conclusion of the report on the Pilot Survey that the Risk Rating Approach should 
lead to a better allocation of resources within HMRC and possibly a change in 
behaviour in terms of transparency and openness but is unlikely to change the attitude 
of specific corporate taxpayers towards planning.57 This view has since also received 
broad support from research carried out on behalf of HMRC.58 
The Main Survey suggested that the relationship between HMRC and large businesses 
is moving in the right direction. Many of the interviewees appreciated the 
improvement brought about by cost effective use of resources and a more efficient 
resolution of issues. Many also professed to be truly committed to openness, 
transparency and good governance. Indeed, there were a few clear cases in which 
HMRC’s efforts appeared to make a difference on these issues. In all these senses, at 
this stage in their development, the RRA and the related proposals implementing the 
Varney Review can be said to be a success.  
As predicted, however, the RRA has been less successful in altering tax planning 
behaviour. Two features must be present for this to occur. Firstly, all types of 
company, whatever their size and complexity, must be able to move from higher to 
low risk. Whether this was possible was still uncertain at the time of the Pilot Survey, 
but HMRC have gone some way in clarifying the ability of large complex 
                                                 
55 See proposal 7 of the Varney Delivery Plan (n 1 above). 
56 5 interviewees. The research carried out on behalf of HMRC found, more generally, that ‘the 
personality of individual contacts within HMRC was felt to be crucial’: HMRC Research Report 58 (n 
5 above) p 21. 
57 Pilot Survey Full Report (n 3 above) pp 17-18. 
58 ‘There were generally pessimistic views about whether the risk review would incentivise tax 
behaviour changes, other than by highlighting potential areas for improvement. This was explained as 
resulting both from conscious decisions about attitude towards tax risk, and the inherent risk status of 
businesses due to their size, structure and nature.’ HMRC Research Report 58 (n 5 above) p 27.  
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multinationals to be low risk, since it is the management of inherent risk and not the 
inherent risk per se which is taken into account. Secondly, the incentives to effect the 
necessary behavioural changes to become low risk must be in place. HMRC has 
clarified what the benefits of being low risk are, however, a number of interviewees 
from higher risk companies either said they still cannot see what the benefits are, or 
that these benefits are not substantial enough to justify altering their tax planning 
behaviour. These interviewees all seemed to share the same view: they want to be 
open, transparent and have good governance in place, but they do not want to alter 
their tax planning behaviour (which they engage in only if it is legal even though it 
may be ‘aggressive’ in the view of HMRC). Company management ultimately applies 
a cost/benefit analysis to this question. If the benefit of being low risk (savings made 
through certainty and lighter engagement with HMRC) do not outweigh the costs 
(foregoing the savings made from tax planning) then companies will simply not have 
sufficient incentives to make the necessary changes to become low risk. This is 
particularly so when the question of where the boundary of the law lies is still, often, 
very indeterminate. Differences in opinion as to whether planning is acceptable or not 
are merely viewed as legitimate differences in the interpretation of a statute.  
Out of the 12 companies at the lower end of the scale (including seven low risk 
companies) interviewed for the Main Survey only three seem to be conservative in 
their tax planning purely out of choice; the vast majority seem to be conservative due 
to circumstances, be they the particular industry or line of business they are in, their 
particular legal structure, or their low corporate tax bill. This suggests that generally 
companies will not deliberately curtail their tax planning to any significant extent if 
they are given a choice. The benefits of tax planning are too high and the cost too low 
to give it up. The RRA has not altered, and, the authors believe, is unlikely to alter 
this fact.  
Can the influence of shareholders, investors or even the wider community make a 
difference? A number of reports and studies have in fact elaborated the way in which 
efforts by companies to understand and manage tax risk can enhance shareholder 
value.59 Others have even suggested that a company’s approach to taxpaying and tax 
planning are relevant to its broader corporate responsibility.60 HMRC’s effort to bring 
tax into the boardroom could thus be seen, in part, as an attempt to encourage 
                                                 
59 DF Williams, KPMG’s Tax Business School, Developing the Concept of Tax Governance (2007); 
Henderson Global Investors, Tax, Risk and Corporate Governance (February 2005); Henderson Global 
Investors, Responsible Tax (October 2005); K Lee and N Antill (Citigroup), Generation (Ta)X – An 
Investors’ Guide To Analysing Tax Risk (Citigroup Global Markets, London, September 2005) 
(‘Citigroup Report’).  This report is proprietary and is referred to herein with the authors’ permission. 
60 SustainAbility, Taxing Issues- Responsible Business and Tax (2006). For academic discussions see: 
R Avi-Yonah, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Strategic Tax Behaviour’ (n 7 above); R Avi-
Yonah, ‘Aggressive Tax Behaviour and Corporate Social Responsibility’ (n 7 above); R Fraser, 
‘“Aggressive Tax Behaviour” and Corporate Social Responsibility: A Response’ (n 7 above); D 
McBarnet, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, For Law: The New Corporate 
Accountability’ in D McBarnet, A Voiculescu and T Campbell (eds), The New Corporate 
Accountability (CUP, 2007); J Freedman, ‘The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? 
Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility’ in J Holder and C O’Cinneide (eds), 59 
Current Legal Problems (2006) 359. Also see the discussion in the Pilot Survey Full Report (n 3 
above) p 38. 
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directors to consider what their duties to shareholders and, perhaps, stakeholders at 
large, require of them in terms of tax and tax planning.61 
These issues were broached in detail in the Pilot Survey62 and were revisited with 
some of the interviewees this year. The limited number of interviewees with whom 
these issues were discussed means that the results must be assessed with caution but 
the Main Survey seems to confirm the finding in the Pilot Survey that shareholders 
and analysts do not, in the main, pay much attention to tax matters. It also seems to 
confirm that tax is not yet seen as a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) matter in 
the broad sense, that is, as defined by the European Commission: ‘enterprises 
deciding to go beyond minimum legal requirements and obligations stemming from 
collective agreements in order to address societal needs.’63 
In the Main Survey, however, tax did seem to give rise to stronger reputational 
concerns than it did in the Pilot Survey. This, one could argue, brings tax into the CSR 
agenda in a narrow sense, that is, in the sense of a director’s duty to take into account 
the broader interests of stakeholders, including customers and the community in 
general, to the extent that that furthers the maximization of shareholder value over 
time.64 A majority of interviewees who discussed this point seemed concerned about 
reputational repercussions if their tax planning was subject to negative press coverage. 
These views could have been influenced by the negative press coverage of some tax 
planning undertaken by Tesco at the time the interviews were carried out.65 This 
notwithstanding, further research is needed on the question of the impact of negative 
press coverage on a company’s tax planning on a company’s profits and / or its share 
price.66 Whether reputational concerns can be strong enough to compel a curtailment 
of a company’s tax planning behaviour is still to be seen.  
3 TARGETED ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES 
3.1 The Motivation for Addressing TAARs and PBL 
As discussed above, a major part of each interview concerned tax risk and 
relationships between large businesses and the revenue administration. These issues 
are not altogether distinct from the nature and impact of targeted anti-avoidance rules 
(TAARs) and principles-based legislation (PBL), the issues addressed in the current 
and subsequent sections of the paper. Indeed, it seems that a crucial aspect of tax risk 
and tax relationships is how the relevant legislation, particularly anti-avoidance 
legislation, is conceived, drafted, and applied. This hypothesis was borne out in the 
Main Survey interviews. 
                                                 
61 See the discussion of HMRC’s engagement at board level at pp 9-11 above. 
62 Pilot Survey Full Report (n 3 above) pp 38-41. 
63 European Commission Communication COM (2006) 01136. 
64 This can be described as the Enlightened Shareholder Value approach. For a discussion of this 
approach see DTI, The Strategic Framework (London, February 1999, URN 99/654). 
65 The first article was published in February 2008. Some of the articles and updates on the libel action 
undertaken by Tesco against The Guardian can be found at http://www.guardian.co.uk, although the 
initial articles have now been removed since they were shown to be incorrect. 
66 For commentary on research in the USA see M Desai, ‘Corporate Governance and Taxation: The 
Implications for Financial Reporting’ and  M Hanlon, ‘Analysing the Impact of Tax Avoidance’ both  
in Beyond Boundaries (n 3 above) but even in respect to the USA the research is not conclusive.  
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The aim of the Main Survey was to investigate the large business perspective 
regarding TAARs and PBL by asking a number of broad questions about those topics 
but also by analyzing detailed hypothetical scenarios in each interview. The scenarios, 
which were provided to each interviewee a few days in advance, are summarized here 
and are explained in full in Appendix II. Each example involved some element of tax 
planning the effectiveness of which could be affected by recent or proposed anti-
avoidance legislation, specifically the loan relationships TAAR,67 the draft legislation 
on financial products avoidance,68 and the restrictions on allowable losses TAAR.69 
Each scenario was based on examples discussed in HMRC publications, with 
additional details provided in order to make the scenarios more realistic. The goal was 
to move beyond generalities in order to understand how businesses might assess and 
react to TAARs and PBL as a practical matter, and to compare such assessments and 
reactions to the academic and policy commentary on these developing legislative 
approaches. In addition, an overarching goal was to draw connections between these 
results and the conclusions regarding tax risk and relationships. 
3.2 The Nature and Impact of TAARs 
The targeted approach to curtailing unacceptable tax avoidance represents a middle 
route between the application of a general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) (whether 
legislated or judicially created) and the use of detailed technical measures to counter 
every transaction that is considered unacceptable. The TAAR concept is not new but 
it appears that the terminology has only recently been adopted by HMRC and 
Treasury.70 Unlike detailed prescriptive legislation, TAARs and GAARs usually place 
significance on a taxpayer’s motives for carrying out a transaction. 
3.2.1 General Comments on the Impact of TAARs and Other Anti-
Avoidance Provisions 
The Main Survey questions asked tax directors which TAARs they had encountered 
in practice and whether they viewed the introduction of new TAARs positively. In 
this context the authors highlighted a statement made by HMRC in a recent policy 
document that ‘TAARs aim to strike a balance between generality and specificity’,71 
asking interviewees if they felt this balance is struck correctly. 
While not every respondent had dealt with actual application of TAARs to 
transactions carried out by his or her firm, all respondents agreed that existing TAARs 
could potentially affect a variety of transactions that they undertake. The degree of 
concern regarding TAARs varied, however. A majority of interviewees (17) were 
emphatic that some TAARs are too general, too vague, or too opaque, such that they 
threaten to capture what these interviewees often described as ‘legitimate commercial 
                                                 
67 FA 1996 sections 91A through 91G, as amended. 
68 HMT and HMRC, Principles-based approach to financial products avoidance: a consultation 
document (December 2007) (‘PBL Consultation Document’), available at 
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/legislation/ 
disguised-interest-intro.htm>. The proposed legislation is discussed in section 4.1 below. 
69 TCGA 1992 section 16A. 
70 DF Williams, ‘Avoidance through the Creation and Use of Capital Losses by Companies’ [2006] 
BTR 23, referring to the 2005 HMRC guidance on the predecessor to TCGA 1992 s 16A.  
71 HMRC, Simplifying anti-avoidance legislation (12 March 2008) (‘Simplification Progress Report’) 
para A.10, available at <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2008/supplementary.htm>. 
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transactions’. A smaller group (three) complained about the generality of certain 
TAARs but tended to focus on the complexity and specificity of other rules, noting 
the effort required to plan around them. The final 10 respondents felt that there was 
always a risk of TAARs applying to transactions they undertake, yet they do not 
worry much about that risk because they are confident in the commerciality of their 
activities. It is notable that most of the tax directors in the last group were from 
companies that have been rated by HMRC as low risk, were on the lower end of the 
risk spectrum, or were not dealt with by the LBS. 
Some tax directors identified particular anti-avoidance provisions which they felt 
were too specific, including aspects of the loan relationships and repossessions rules, 
which in their view have led to the need for further detailed legislation to counteract 
innovative schemes. However, when addressing TAARs that take account of a 
taxpayer’s motives, the dominant theme of the responses was that these rules are too 
broad in scope, leading to a lack of clarity.72 Anti-avoidance provisions that were 
often highlighted as being too generally worded, and thus too vague, were the 
restrictions on allowable losses rules, arbitrage rules, and provisions of the CFC 
regime, although this list is not exhaustive. A majority of the FTSE 250 respondents 
opined that TAARs which seem to be targeted at highly contrived tax schemes – in 
their view employed predominantly by large financial institutions – may nonetheless 
affect ‘commercial tax planning’ carried out by medium-sized firms. They find 
themselves in a situation where they assume that this commercial tax planning is 
‘onside’ yet they harbour fears that it will be considered offside according to some 
rule or another. 
3.2.2 The Contribution of TAARs and Other Anti-Avoidance Provisions to 
Legislative Complexity and Uncertainty 
Beyond the question of generality and specificity, most tax directors interviewed 
addressed the complexity and uncertainty of UK tax legislation, with TAARs and 
detailed anti-avoidance rules being illustrations of such problems. Interviewees 
identified various causes of legislative complexity and instability, including: (1) a 
constant thirst for tax reform by HMRC and Treasury, often described by interviewees 
as legislative ‘tinkering’; (2) an increasingly global and sophisticated business 
environment; and (3) a keen desire for tax law to be detailed and precise. Most 
respondents seemed to place the greatest weight on the first of these factors. However, 
seven respondents expressly recognized in the interviews that the responsibility for 
legislative complexity and change may lie as much with business as it does with 
government; they conceded that the exploitation of tax minimization opportunities 
and the demand for legal certainty by businesses have contributed to the current 
legislative framework. Some described the cycle of prescriptive legislation, loophole 
exploitation, and further prescriptive legislation as a ‘cat and mouse game’. 
Opinions differed regarding whether legislative complexity or instability were 
significant problems and, if so, whether they diminished the attractiveness of the UK 
as a location for corporate activity. It is important to note that the Main Survey 
interviews were carried out at a time when corporate tax dominated the business 
section of the press. Corporate tax issues appeared on the front page of the Financial 
Times day after day and also surfaced in more general news programmes. This 
                                                 
72 The interpretation of purpose-based TAARs is discussed in section 3.2.3 below. 
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interest in tax matters, and particularly in the competitiveness of the UK’s corporate 
tax regime, was ignited by the relocation of Shire plc and UBM to Ireland. The reason 
most often given for the emigrations was the negative impact of the proposed rules on 
the taxation of foreign profits,73 but the overall complexity of the UK tax system was 
also cited. To some, the relocation of Shire and UBM had merely confirmed earlier 
predictions that a ‘radical overhaul’ of the UK corporate tax system was needed in 
order to regain the country’s international competitive position.74 While 
acknowledging the contribution of various factors to the competitiveness of the tax 
regime, the interviews focused on the contribution (if any) of anti-avoidance 
complexity and uncertainty. 
A majority of Main Survey respondents (23) expressed exasperation with the 
complexity and unpredictability of current anti-avoidance rules, all but one asserting 
that this was a phenomenon hindering the competitiveness of the UK economy.75 
Some of these interviewees emphasized that they would much prefer a simple, stable 
system over a complex, unpredictable system, even if it meant there were fewer tax 
planning opportunities available. Other respondents stressed that there is too much 
‘layering’ of anti-avoidance provisions on top of other provisions, some giving the 
example of the amendments to the loan relationships rules in FA 2007 and FA 2008. 
Four interviewees observed that the stream of anti-avoidance legislation make it very 
difficult to discern what the government’s long term tax policies are – other than 
stopping avoidance. It was often said that excessive compliance costs stem not so 
much from structuring or defending a firm’s tax affairs, but from trying to 
comprehend all applicable legislation. 
The remaining seven tax directors recognized that anti-avoidance provisions 
contribute to legislative complexity but did not criticize it, either because they felt the 
complexity was manageable or because they believed that such provisions have no 
relevance to someone operating a ‘commercial’ business. These respondents insisted 
that complexity in itself has little effect on the competitiveness of the UK, arguing 
that legislative complexity follows from the complexity of modern international 
commerce. All of these interviewees stressed that the volatility of the UK tax system, 
including the instability of its anti-avoidance provisions, was more of a concern than 
complexity. It was said that in an environment of constant change it is difficult or 
impossible to forecast after-tax profits. 
                                                 
73 See HMT & HMRC, Taxation of the foreign profits of companies: a discussion document (June 
2007), available at < http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/consultations_and_legislation/foreign_profits/ 
consult_foreign_profits.cfm>.The Government has now put its proposals on the taxation of foreign 
profits on hold – see HMT Update on Review of Foreign Profits (21 July 2008) available at 
<http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/consultations_and_legislation/foreign_profits/consult_foreign_profits.cfm>. 
74 See CBI Tax Task Force, UK business tax: a compelling case for change (March 2008) available at 
<http://www.cbi.org.uk>. 
75 About half of these respondents added that, while they were concerned about the complexity and 
uncertainty of anti-avoidance provisions, the uncertainty surrounding the proposals for the taxation of 
foreign profits (n 73 above) was more significant to them. 
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3.2.3 Interpretations of Purpose Rules used in TAARs 
As mentioned above, most TAARs emphasize a taxpayer’s motive or motives for 
carrying out a transaction. This is illustrated by two provisions that were under 
consideration in the hypothetical tax planning scenarios discussed in the interviews.76  
First, the application of the loan relationships rules (FA 1996 sections 91A through 
91G) depends on satisfying certain conditions including a condition concerning the 
taxpayer’s purpose or main purposes. Section 91D provides, in part: 
(9) For the purposes of this section, a share is acquired by the investing 
company for an unallowable purpose if the purpose, or one of the main 
purposes, for which the company holds the share is— 
(a)  the purpose of circumventing section 95 of the Taxes Act 1988 …, 
or 
(b)  any other purpose which is a tax avoidance purpose … [any 
purpose that consists in securing a tax advantage]. 
Similarly, the restrictions on allowable losses rule in section TCGA 1992 section 16A 
provides, in part: 
(1)  For the purposes of this Act, “allowable loss” does not include a loss 
accruing to a person if— 
(a)  it accrues to the person directly or indirectly in consequence of, or 
otherwise in connection with, any arrangements, and 
(b)  the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the 
arrangements is to secure a tax advantage. 
It is important to note that these TAARs are concerned with a taxpayer’s purpose or 
purposes in implementing a transaction. A few interviewees approached the questions 
regarding the determination of main or primary purpose, at least initially, by 
addressing statutory purpose and speculating how purposive interpretation of TAARs 
might differ from purely textual interpretation. This confusion is understandable given 
that there has been so much debate recently about the scope of purposive statutory 
interpretation as a means of distinguishing acceptable tax avoidance from 
unacceptable tax avoidance.77 When this confusion arose it was explained that the aim 
was to understand how large businesses construe their own purposes in implementing 
a transaction and how they distinguish among a multiple such purposes. 
Two key results emerged from the interviews with respect to TAAR purpose tests. 
First, there was a preference among the interviewees for the use of common language 
across the various purpose tests. Some said that having different legal phraseology for 
the same concept ‘isn’t helpful’ and no interviewee could identify the practical 
                                                 
76 Interviewees’ reactions to the scenarios are discussed in section 3.2.4 below and the detailed 
scenarios are set out in Appendix II. 
77 See for example: Lord Hoffmann, ‘Tax Avoidance’ [2005] BTR 197; J Freedman, ‘Interpreting Tax 
Statutes: Tax Avoidance and the Intention of Parliament’ (n 7 above). 
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difference between a primary purpose, a main purpose, or a purported multiplicity of 
‘main purposes’. One interviewee stated that there is little need to concern oneself 
with the different tests as one would expect judges to apply a single test anyway. 
Second, a large majority of respondents demonstrated a preference for a single legal 
test that focuses solely on a taxpayer’s ‘main’, ‘primary’, ‘underlying’, or 
‘overwhelming’ purpose behind a transaction, rather than a test that contemplates 
multiple ‘main purposes’. 16 interviewees expressed this preference clearly, often 
stating that such a test was essential in order to allow commercial transactions to be 
implemented in a tax-efficient manner. Eight others were less explicit but nevertheless 
seemed to stress the importance of a taxpayer’s primary motivation for a transaction, 
sometimes referring to the importance of the Duke of Westminster principle. Of the 
remaining respondents, some said they were not unhappy with current TAAR purpose 
tests, some said they preferred alternative tests that depended on economic outcomes 
rather than subjective intentions, and some were unclear about their preference. 
The following arguments were put forward by the 24 respondents who favoured a 
main or primary purpose test in TAARs. 
First, some said that tests like that in FA 1996 section 91D or TCGA 1992 section 
16A, which refer to multiple main purposes for a transaction, contemplate an 
unreasonable level of detail or ‘granularity’ in a company’s motivations. One tax 
director expressed this view by stating that detailed purpose tests are not ‘meaningful’ 
to boards: either they are comfortable with the overall commercial objective of an 
arrangement or they are not. Several respondents agreed that counsel opinions are 
sought regarding which of several purposes was dominant in an impugned transaction. 
However, it was commonly felt that such opinions are of little value. 
This complaint was connected to the broader policy issue raised by a majority of the 
interviewees, namely, the need to preserve taxpayers’ ability to structure commercial 
transactions in a tax-efficient manner. Most respondents argued that virtually any 
commercial arrangement will be structured in a tax-advantaged manner, often stating 
that it would be ‘irrational’ or ‘foolish’ to ignore tax considerations. A few 
respondents asserted that a test based on ‘one of the main purposes’ gives scope to 
HMRC to insist that taxpayers implement the highest-tax comparator transaction. It 
was frequently said that the focus of motive-based TAARs should be where the 
particular transaction began: with a firm’s commercial officers/managers or with its 
tax department/advisers. However, there were varying degrees of enthusiasm for 
basing anti-avoidance rules solely on a taxpayer’s primary or overwhelming purpose, 
even among those who were broadly supportive of such a threshold. This is best 
illustrated by interviewees’ reactions to the hypothetical scenarios, discussed in 
section 3.2.4 below. 
It was noted that the freedom to structure transactions in a tax-efficient way depends 
not only on the text of relevant TAARs but also on HMRC’s interpretation and 
application of those provisions. Half of the respondents indicated that they had 
disagreed with HMRC about the main purpose or purposes of a transaction, or 
expected imminently to have such a disagreement. Most said that the question 
whether the presence of some tax purpose takes a transaction offside of a TAAR 
depends on whether HMRC personnel analyzing the transaction apply the rule 
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‘sensibly’.78 They felt that appropriate application of TAARs by HMRC personnel 
requires a strong appreciation of the business perspective. Opinions regarding the 
level of commercial awareness and sophistication of HMRC personnel were more 
pronounced in respondents’ answers about principles-based legislation, thus the issue 
is addressed in more detail in section 4.2.3 below. 
3.2.4   Reactions to Scenarios79 
3.2.4.1   Preferred Share Financing Arrangement 
In this example a holding company in a UK group (ACo) has cash on hand in excess 
of its current requirements. It is considering various opportunities for investing these 
funds and identifies BCo, an unconnected private company, as an attractive 
investment. The reasons for this include that: BCo carries on a complementary 
business; BCo is expected to become profitable in the near future; and BCo has tax 
losses carried forward. Because of its loss position, BCo is indifferent between paying 
dividends on equity financing and paying interest on debt financing – thus BCo is 
willing to offer a preferred share dividend which exceeds what comparable companies 
might offer and which approaches a commercial interest rate. ACo decides to invest in 
a block of BCo preference shares which are cumulative, redeemable, and carry a fixed 
rate dividend. 
Interviewees were told that the taxpayer’s advisers took the view that the loan 
relationships rules would not apply so as to treat the dividends received by ACo on 
the preference shares as taxable income, largely because ACo’s purpose in acquiring 
the preference shares is not an ‘unallowable purpose’ under FA 1966 section 91D. 
Interviewees were also told that, in contrast, the HMRC Corporate Finance Manual 
suggests that an investment in cumulative redeemable preferred shares, where the 
issuer is in a loss position and the dividend rate is broadly similar to the commercial 
interest rate, gives rise to a creditor loan relationship because the arrangement is 
motivated by tax avoidance.80 
A substantial majority of respondents stated that this transaction should be permitted 
as a policy matter. Specifically, 22 respondents said that the ‘main’, ‘primary’, 
‘underlying’, or ‘overwhelming’ commercial objective of this transaction was 
investment of surplus funds; they felt that the presence of such a commercial objective 
was sufficient to make this transaction legitimate. The eight remaining interviewees 
were ambivalent or equivocal, suggesting that this transaction was probably 
acceptable but depended on the relative weight of the various commercial and tax 
motivations. Notably, no respondents said unequivocally that this transaction should 
be considered unacceptable as a policy matter. Virtually all interviewees tended to 
apply a main or primary purpose test when assessing the transaction, consistent with 
the responses summarized above. Beyond the presence of a commercial motivation, 
some interviewees (11) also felt that this transaction should be considered acceptable 
because of the ‘symmetry’ or ‘parity’ between the payor of the dividend and the 
recipient of the dividend. These respondents argued that it was irrelevant that BCo has 
                                                 
78 A range of respondents (8) highlighted the CFC ‘motive test’ contained in ICTA 1988 section 
748(3), arguing that HMRC applies this provision overzealously in order to disregard the effectiveness 
of transactions involving foreign subsidiaries. 
79 The scenarios are described in full in Appendix II. 
80 CFM 6320, available at <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/cfmmanual/CFM6320.htm>. 
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tax losses and queried what policy wrong is associated with the ‘use’ or ‘arbitrage’ of 
‘tax attributes’.81 It is interesting that respondents were generally in favour of this 
transaction regardless of whether their respective firms had been rated as low risk or 
higher risk by HMRC. 
Most respondents, despite believing that this transaction should be permitted as a 
policy matter, said that they would be worried about HMRC challenging it under the 
loan relationships rules. 17 interviewees indicated that they would be uncomfortable 
going ahead with this transaction, often pointing to the negative HMRC guidance or 
referring to anecdotal evidence of HMRC’s approach to similar transactions. A further 
six respondents felt that the likelihood of HMRC challenging this transaction 
depended on the perceived balance of tax and non-tax motivations for the investment. 
Finally, five respondents said they likely would go ahead with a transaction of this 
nature despite potential challenge. None said the loan relationship rules were 
inapplicable to this transaction, meaning that the different opinions were based on 
different views of how HMRC would apply the rules. 
3.2.4.2   Share Consolidation Arrangement 
In this example the taxpayer is a UK plc and the ultimate parent of a global group of 
companies. The taxpayer owns three UK holding companies (XCo, YCo, and ZCo) 
which in turn hold various shares and assets. As part of a rationalisation of the group’s 
structure, the taxpayer wishes to sell certain shareholdings to third parties and to 
consolidate its remaining shareholdings within YCo and ZCo. This restructuring 
involves XCo selling off various shares and assets. Among other gains and losses, 
XCo realizes a chargeable gain on a disposition of certain portfolio shares (in G plc) 
and realizes a loss on a disposition of certain other portfolio shares (in L plc), all sold 
to an unconnected third party, P. An option negotiated by the parties specifies that 
ZCo has the right to acquire the L plc shares from P for their market value within 60 
days, provided that the market value has not risen or fallen more than a nominal 
amount. After 40 days ZCo exercises this option and buys the L plc shares from P. 
(Interviewees were also asked to consider a modification of the above scenario where 
ZCo does not exercise its option to buy the L plc shares.) 
Interviewees were told that the taxpayer’s advisers took the view that the loss arising 
on the disposal of the L plc shares by XCo is an ‘allowable loss’ and as such can be 
set off against chargeable gains. In their view, the loss is not subject to the restrictions 
on allowable losses TAAR in section 16A of the TCGA 1992 because it was not the 
main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangement to secure a tax 
advantage. Interviewees were also told that, in contrast, the HMRC guidance with 
respect to section 16A suggests that the loss on the L plc shares might be considered 
‘artificial’ and therefore restricted.82 
Most of the respondents had a more negative view of this transaction compared to the 
preferred share financing arrangement, although opinions were not unanimous. 
Specifically, 18 interviewees felt that this transaction should not be permitted as a 
policy matter, often describing it as ‘artificial’ or ‘contrived’. This group invariably 
                                                 
81 This term appears to refer to the availability of losses and allowances. 
82 HMRC Guidance, Capital Gains Tax – Avoidance through the creation and use of capital losses 
(July 2007) paras 50-53 (Examples 9 and 10). 
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said that the main or primary purpose of the arrangement was loss crystallization 
rather than commercial divestment. They focused on the option negotiated by the 
parties to allow the taxpayer’s group acquire the L plc shares from P at approximately 
the same value as they had been sold to P. Some described this as a ‘repurchase’ 
option and said that the presence of such an option meant there was no ‘real disposal’ 
or no ‘genuine intention’ to dispose. A minority of respondents (five) believed that 
this transaction should be considered acceptable. They emphasized that the 
latent/unrealized loss on the L plc shares was a real economic loss and thus should be 
available to set off against chargeable gains. Two of these interviewees added that the 
tax reduction brought about by recognizing the loss was merely a deferral rather than 
an outright savings. The seven remaining interviewees were ambivalent or equivocal, 
suggesting that the legitimacy of the transaction depended on the relative weight of 
the various commercial and tax motivations. Interviewees who had a negative view of 
this transaction were from a mixture of low risk and higher risk firms, while four of 
the five who expressed favourable views were from higher risk firms. 
All interviewees who addressed section 16A, whatever their policy views of this 
transaction, said that they would be worried about HMRC challenging it. Specifically, 
28 respondents said that the TAAR would apply to this transaction and would almost 
certainly be invoked by HMRC to deny the capital loss on the sale of the L plc shares. 
The majority (18) thought this was a fair result because the transaction was primarily 
tax-driven. One of the five interviewees who took a positive view of this transaction 
said that it was ‘dead in the water’ under section 16A; the others appeared to agree. 
The modified scenario, wherein ZCo does not exercise the option to purchase, 
provoked some interesting discussion. The 10 interviewees who addressed this 
scenario speculated that HMRC’s application of the TAAR would change because of 
the different economic result. Two respondents suggested that this altered treatment 
was deserved, as the economic result (divestment of the L plc shares) would constitute 
evidence of the commercial motivation underlying the transaction. The other eight 
respondents believed that in principle the modified scenario was no different, as the 
taxpayer’s motivations remained the same, yet in practice the treatment would differ. 
One of these interviewees said that even though ‘a main purpose’ of the arrangement 
was securing a tax advantage, HMRC would be unlikely to challenge the modified 
scenario. He described this as ‘untaxing by concession’. He and others observed that 
this difference between principle and practice illustrates the problem with section 
16A. 
3.3 Guidance and Clearances 
The Simplification Progress Report suggests that HMRC guidance can assist 
taxpayers in understanding the intended scope of TAARs.83 While that document does 
not refer to clearances, another rational course of action might be to seek a non-
statutory clearance from HMRC under the recently expanded Clearances Service.84 
Interviewees were asked whether in areas potentially affected by a TAAR there 
                                                 
83 Simplification Progress Report (n 71 above) para A.11. 
84 Developing this service was a key feature of the Varney Review. The service ran as a pilot from 2 
January 2008 and was made more widely available as of April 2008. For further details see 2008 
Framework (n 16 above) and the online guidance to statutory and non-statutory clearances, available at 
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/cap/links-dec07.htm>. 
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should be an associated clearance process, whether they might seek a clearance under 
the current clearances regime and – short of seeking a clearance – whether they would 
rely upon the published guidance for assistance. 
A majority of respondents (19) said that statutory and non-statutory clearances are or 
could be useful, although invariably these were general comments rather than 
comments about TAARs specifically. A further seven interviewees felt that clearances 
are not useful or that taxpayers should not have to depend on them; these interviewees 
insisted that a clearance only represents HMRC’s opinion and has no legal effect. It is 
notable that, while the majority view was expressed by a mix of low and higher risk 
firms, all respondents who viewed clearances negatively were from firms that are on 
the higher end of the risk spectrum. A few interviewees questioned whether 
clearances would ever be given in situations potentially covered by TAARs (or any 
anti-avoidance provisions) given the stated position of HMRC that it will not issue 
clearances where ‘tax avoidance’ activities are involved.85 Another interviewee said 
that an ‘effective clearance mechanism’ could help to provide a level of certainty 
about TAARs that business could live with. A frequently expressed view was that an 
‘effective’ clearance system would have to be fully informed, consistent, and legally 
binding. Even among the majority who viewed clearances positively, a few 
respondents remarked that having to rely on HMRC discretion to apply or dis-apply a 
TAAR is not an ideal system. 
Views regarding HMRC guidance were less enthusiastic. Only eight respondents 
stated that the published guidance is or can be useful to them. Sixteen interviewees 
said that administrative guidance is either undesirable in principle or is not useful in 
practice. For example, three interviewees explained that businesses were 
uncomfortable with the guidance that was issued with TCGA 1992 s 16A because the 
legislation said one thing while the guidance said another – the guidance being more 
favourable to taxpayers. In their view this meant there was something flawed with the 
legislation itself. Three other respondents noted that, in any event, the published 
guidance tends to address simplistic examples and is thus of little value in real world 
situations.  
3.4 Analysis and Conclusions 
As Avery Jones observed in 1996, there is nothing new in complaining about the 
complexity of tax legislation.86 He identified several causes of this complexity, three 
of which were stressed repeatedly by the interviewees with particular reference to 
TAARs. Those causes are: (1) tax reform and associated legislative amendments, 
often in response to avoidance activities, described by the interviewees as legislative 
tinkering; (2) an increasingly global and sophisticated business environment; and (3) a 
keen desire for tax law to be detailed and precise so that its application is certain. 
Avery Jones and others have argued that massive increases in the volume and detail of 
tax legislation have not enhanced legal certainty; rather they have achieved the 
reverse. Most of the interviewees would likely agree with Vann’s estimation that the 
                                                 
85 HMRC, Giving Certainty to Business through Clearances and Advance Agreements (June 2007) para 
3.27 and Annex C. 
86 J Avery Jones, ‘Tax Law: Rules or Principles?’ (1996) 17 Fiscal Studies 63 (IFS Annual Lecture 
1996) 63-65. 
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UK (and other Anglo-Saxon countries) suffers from the disease of ‘tax rule 
madness’,87 the key symptom being an ever-increasing spiral of legislation, loophole 
exploitation, and further legislation. There is no doubt that some of the difficulty 
stems from the courts’ traditional insistence on predominantly textual interpretation of 
taxing statutes, yet much of the responsibility lies with the legislative designers and 
draftsmen. In his 2004 lecture to the Centre of Commercial Law Studies, Lord 
Hoffmann stated that ‘the Revenue appear to have no faith in the ability or willingness 
of the courts to recognise the economic effect beneath the varied forms and often 
prefer to legislate by reference to form rather than substance’.88 
One way to ameliorate this problem may be to enact further purpose-based TAARs, as 
they depend less on the technical details of a transaction and more on a taxpayer’s 
motives for carrying it out. It is far from obvious, however, that the business 
community views such rules as enhancing commercial certainty. These interviews 
indicate that there is significant concern about the generality and potential vagueness 
of such rules. 
The view expressed by many interviewees that HMRC and Treasury should seek to 
achieve common language across the various purpose tests used in TAARs, as the use 
of various phrasing to express the same concept can only lead to confusion, is 
persuasive. Efforts at alignment are currently underway.89 The second suggestion 
arising from a majority of the interviews, namely, that purpose-based TAARs should 
focus solely on a taxpayer’s main or underlying purpose for carrying out a transaction, 
is more problematic. Most would agree that transactions wholly driven by tax 
avoidance (some interviewees referred to creating deductions ‘out of the air’) should 
be prohibited. There can be other transactions, however, where many would agree that 
there is a prevalence of tax structuring despite some overall commercial goal and 
there may be valid policy reasons for Treasury and HMRC to prevent or to limit such 
structuring. Indeed, the different opinions expressed regarding the hypothetical 
scenarios demonstrate that there are different levels of enthusiasm (or, perhaps, 
different interpretations) for ‘main’ or ‘underlying’ purpose tests. In the first example 
most interviewees stressed that ‘the main purpose’ of the transaction was investment, 
not sharing of tax losses, yet their favourable views of the transaction were in some 
cases conditioned by the fact that they viewed sharing of tax attributes as 
unobjectionable. In the second example a majority of interviewees stated that ‘the 
main purpose’ of the transaction was loss crystallization, not restructuring or 
divestment, yet their negative views of the transaction were in some cases buttressed 
by the observation that the UK system for taxing capital gains and losses is based on 
realization rather than accruals. Perhaps what is needed is not some innovation in the 
phrasing of motive-based anti-avoidance rules, but rather a better policy expression in 
the legislation of what activities or economic outcomes are or are not condoned. 
                                                 
87 R Vann ‘Improving Tax Law Improvement: An International Perspective’ (1995) Australian Tax 
Forum 193, 222, cited in Avery Jones (ibid). 
88 Lord Hoffmann (n 77 above) 205-206. 
89 Simplification Progress Report (n 71 above) para 3.8. 
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4 PRINCIPLES-BASED LEGISLATION 
4.1 The Nature and Expected Impact of PBL 
Various commentators have argued that the ever-increasing spiral of detailed tax 
legislation, and its attendant lack of certainty, can only be resolved by shifting to an 
entirely new legislative approach, variously styled as ‘purposive drafting’ or 
‘principles-based drafting’.90 As Krever explains, there is a difference between 
purposive drafting and principles-based drafting. A purposive rule is still a rule, 
whereas a principle is something external to the rules that explains how the relevant 
rules should be construed. What purposive legislation and PBL have in common is 
that they constitute a further step away from the traditional approach of detailed 
prescriptive legislation. There is an appetite for PBL among policy makers who have 
grown frustrated with the failures of prescriptive legislation and TAARs. This appetite 
is illustrated by various Australian efforts91 and, more recently, by the PBL 
Consultation Document.92 
The PBL Consultation Document was issued in December 2007 along with draft 
legislation, which was revised in February 2008 in response to a series of open day 
discussions and written representations. However, the government decided not to 
include the revised draft legislation in the 2008 Finance Bill in order to allow further 
time for consultation.93 HMRC and Treasury are conducting a series of workshops 
with various stakeholders during summer 2008 with a view to making progress in 
2008-9.94 
As the PBL Consultation Document and revised draft legislation on financial products 
avoidance represents the first express attempt by HMRC and Treasury to enact 
purposive or principles-based legislation, the survey questions were focused on those 
proposals. Comments were also welcomed from respondents regarding the merits and 
challenges of PBL more generally. 
4.2 Seeking Simplicity, Certainty, and Revenue Protection 
The PBL Consultation Document stressed that a principles-based approach would 
further the goals of simplicity, certainty, and revenue protection in the UK tax 
system.95 It also stated that such an approach would promote fairness and consistency 
in tax treatment. The draft ‘principle’ regarding disguised interest was expressed as a 
purpose statement in the February 2008 revised draft legislation. Section 1 of the draft 
Schedule provided: 
                                                 
90 eg Avery Jones (n 86 above); B Drummond, ‘A Purposive Approach to the Drafting of Tax 
Legislation’ [2006] BTR 669; R Krever, ‘Plain English Drafting, Purposive Drafting, Principles-based 
Drafting: Does Any of it Matter?’ in Beyond Boundaries (n 3 above) 189. 
91 Pinder and Berkeley, Coherent Principles Approach (Australian Treasury 2005). 
92 PBL Consultation Document (n 68 above). 
93 Simplification Progress Report (n 71 above) para 2.10. 
94 It would seem that some of the points made by the interviewees may well be taken on board as a 
result of this process. 
95 PBL Consultation Document (n 68 above) para 1.8. See also Simplification Progress Report (n 71 
above) paras A.15–A.18. 
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1.  The purpose of this Schedule is to secure that (subject to exceptions, and 
except where double taxation would result) a return designed to be 
economically equivalent to interest is treated in the same way as interest for 
the purposes of corporation tax. 
The stated purpose is achieved through the concept of a ‘tax-privileged investment 
return’, which is defined (in general terms) as a return which equates, in substance, to 
a return on an investment of money at interest yet is not wholly charged to tax as 
interest. The new legislation would allow simplification in that existing provisions 
could be repealed, including FA 1996 sections 91A to 91G. 
4.2.1 Comments on PBL as a New Legislative Approach 
The interviews suggest that there is some theoretical interest in a principles-based 
approach as a means of improving the simplicity of the UK tax system. A majority of 
the respondents (20) felt that PBL is a way forward and is worth exploring as an 
alternative to overly specific prescriptive legislation and overly broad TAARs. They 
generally agreed that a principles-based approach would further the objectives of 
simplicity and revenue protection. These respondents’ enthusiasm was tempered, 
however, by concerns about the need for certainty and appreciation of the business 
perspective. It was often said that any legislated principles should be ‘meaningful’, 
‘focused’, and ‘clear’, and should only be enacted following extensive consultation 
with stakeholders. Only four of these 20 respondents were optimistic that a principles-
based approach could enhance commercial certainty. It is notable that three of these 
four respondents were from firms that have been rated as low risk by HMRC. The 
remaining interviewees feared that a move towards PBL would reduce certainty but 
they were nonetheless in favour of exploring the approach. 
A further five interviewees expressed the opinion that a principles-based approach is, 
as a policy matter, undesirable. These respondents stated that they preferred explicit 
legislation and were wary of ‘legislation by guidance’. A few of those opposed to 
PBL stated that they simply did not trust HMRC personnel to apply broad principles 
with an appropriate focus or with a consistent view of which planning activities are 
and are not acceptable.96 Interestingly, there was no obvious correlation between this 
view and a firm’s risk rating. The remaining five tax directors were agnostic about the 
merits of PBL or did not express a clear opinion either way. 
A recurring theme in the interviews was that there will be significant challenges 
integrating PBL into current UK tax law, not only due to resistance from businesses 
but also because of incompatibility with UK legal norms. Nine interviewees, whether 
in favour of PBL or not, remarked that the British courts would struggle with a 
principles-based system initially, speculating that more time would be spent in 
litigation to clarify the scope of the relevant provisions. Others felt that counsel would 
have similar difficulties. 
4.2.2 Comments on the Draft PBL 
In contrast to the broadly positive comments received about PBL as a new legislative 
approach, none of the tax directors interviewed were happy with the 2007 draft or 
                                                 
96 See sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 below. 
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2008 revised draft legislation on financial products avoidance. 22 of the interviewees 
offered comments on the draft legislation; the remaining eight did not comment, 
usually because they had not analyzed the legislation or been involved in the 
consultations. Most of the concerns from the 22 respondents fell into two categories: 
the lack of precision in the stated principle and the lack of effective consultation in the 
development of the principle. 
First, aside from one respondent who felt that the draft legislation was not ‘ambitious’ 
enough in its scope, most interviewees argued that the draft legislation suffered from a 
lack of clarity and was thus excessively broad and vague. Specifically, nine 
respondents believed that the way the provisions were drafted – or the way that the 
draft guidance indicated they would be interpreted – meant that the legislation 
threatened a variety of ‘commercial transactions’ which in their view should not be so 
affected. The remaining interviewees seemed to agree with this view without saying 
so expressly. Some respondents described the principle governing disguised interest – 
namely, that a return  ‘designed to be economically equivalent to interest’ should be 
treated in the same way as interest – as ‘unprincipled’ because it went beyond the 
‘headline intention’. For example, virtually all of the respondents queried why 
preferred share financing arrangements like that described in the first hypothetical 
scenario should fall within the draft provisions.97 It was suggested that HMRC’s 
concern with such arrangements is not that the intercorporate dividend is similar to 
interest; rather, it is that the benefit of tax losses is being shared among unconnected 
parties, what was sometimes referred to as ‘sharing of tax attributes’. Others queried 
why the draft principle should be used to prevent ‘recognition of non-trading losses’ 
within a corporate group. 
The second and related concern expressed by some respondents (seven) was that there 
had been a lack of ‘real’ or ‘effective’ consultation regarding the draft legislation.98 
There was a common feeling among these respondents that the push to implement the 
draft PBL in Budget 2008 was too rushed. Some felt that the consultations only 
happened after the substantial issues had been decided within HMRC and Treasury.99 
They suggested that more thorough consultation would have resulted in greater 
refinement of the stated principle, perhaps to exclude further ‘commercial 
transactions’ from its scope. 
4.2.3 Reactions to Scenario 
The preferred share financing arrangement described above was a scenario regarding 
which interviewees were asked to consider both the current TAAR (section 91D of 
FA 1996) and the draft PBL on disguised interest. Consistent with the current 
guidance in the Corporate Finance Manual, the PBL Consultation Document suggests 
that an investment in cumulative redeemable preferred shares, where the issuer is in a 
loss position and the dividend rate is broadly similar to the commercial interest rate, 
                                                 
97 See section 4.2.3 below. 
98 It should be reiterated that these interviews were conducted in April and May 2008. This was prior to 
HMRC’s announcement that it would revise the draft legislation in accordance with comments received 
in early 2008 and would conduct further consultations with stakeholders via invitational workshops in 
August 2008. 
99 It should be noted that since the proposals have not been implemented and are still being consulted 
on, this is not in fact what has happened, mainly due to the responses to the consultation.  
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gives rise to a ‘tax-privileged investment return’ because the arrangement is motivated 
by tax avoidance.100 
As mentioned above, a substantial majority of respondents felt that this transaction 
should be permitted as a policy matter yet most were worried about HMRC 
challenging it under the loan relationships rules. Similarly, most respondents who 
were familiar with the draft legislation and guidance stated that they would be worried 
about HMRC challenging this transaction under the proposed PBL. 13 interviewees 
said that they would be more uncomfortable about proceeding with this transaction 
under the draft PBL than under the current TAAR. This was generally because, as one 
interviewee put it, HMRC could make a reasonable argument that the dividend was 
‘economically equivalent’ to a loan at interest whereas the same argument would not 
be viable under the existing rules. A further nine interviewees felt it made no 
difference to the analysis whether one applied the draft PBL or the current TAAR. 
None of the interviewees said that they would be more comfortable proceeding with 
this transaction under the proposed legislation, which is perhaps not surprising. An 
interesting observation made by four respondents was that HMRC routinely used to 
allow transactions of this nature, one of them observing that freedom to share tax 
attributes was considered essential to the viability of the UK economy. They 
nevertheless conceded that the draft PBL on disguised interest (and, to a lesser extent, 
the loan relationships rules) mandated a different result. 
4.2.4 What are the Characteristics of Good PBL? 
As explained above, a majority of respondents were at least cautiously optimistic 
about PBL as a new legislative approach yet were dissatisfied with the 2007 and 2008 
draft PBL on financial products avoidance. The survey therefore sought to identify the 
features which respondents would associate with well crafted principles-based 
provisions. The characteristics that were most commonly identified were: 
certainty/clarity of the principle; consistency in application of the principle; and 
appreciation of the business perspective in crafting and applying the principle. 
Virtually all of those who were in favour of PBL stressed that any legislated 
principles should be ‘meaningful’, ‘focused’, and ‘clear’. A few respondents (five) 
observed that the desired level of certainty/clarity in legislated principles would 
require a greater ‘common understanding’ between HMRC and business about what 
types of planning activity are acceptable.101 Another aspect of certainty/clarity raised 
by six interviewees was the need to guard against the conflation of multiple policy 
goals under a single vague principle. As mentioned above, some respondents felt that 
the policy concern about ‘interest-like’ investment returns going untaxed, which was 
the purported motivation for the draft PBL on disguised interest, should not be 
confused with other policy concerns. 
A virtue closely related to clarity is consistency. Various respondents emphasized that 
PBL will be welcomed by taxpayers only if they can trust HMRC to apply the 
relevant principles consistently. Six interviewees pointed to the frequent amendments 
in detailed anti-avoidance rules, as well as changes in the application of TAAR 
motive tests, as evidence of fluctuating tax policies which detract from taxpayer trust. 
                                                 
100 PBL Consultation Document (n 68 above) paras 2.1, 2.26-2.29 (Example 7). 
101 This issue is discussed in greater detail in the Pilot Survey Full Report (n 3 above). 
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Indeed, when addressing the first hypothetical scenario, four of the interviewees 
remarked that HMRC routinely used to allow such transactions, yet the draft PBL and 
associated guidance suggest such transactions are contrary to the draft principle. 
Respondents also pointed to examples of reversals in HMRC’s acceptance of other 
specific transactions. 
Finally, half of the interviewees stated that a functioning principles-based system 
cannot be achieved without HMRC and Treasury gaining a better understanding of the 
business perspective. It was felt that this understanding could be achieved partly 
through consultations on the relevant draft provisions, but more fundamentally by 
HMRC undergoing a ‘culture change’. Some of these respondents highlighted that 
there are not enough HMRC personnel with a strong understanding of the 
complexities of modern business, particularly international business, making it 
difficult for them to apply tax principles to business transactions in a focused and 
objective manner. Three such interviewees explicitly recognized that better 
relationships brought about by the Varney Review have improved commercial 
awareness within HMRC, although not yet extending to their international businesses. 
The relationship between the new forms of legislation and the new post Varney 
relationship are discussed further in part five of this paper below. 
4.3 Guidance and Clearances 
It is acknowledged in the PBL Consultation Document that principles-based 
provisions necessitate detailed guidance in order to achieve sufficient commercial 
certainty. It can be expected that a robust clearance regime would also assist taxpayers 
with their decision-making around principles-based provisions. Thus, as with the 
discussions regarding TAARs, interviewees were asked whether in areas potentially 
affected by PBL they would find clearances and guidance to be of assistance. The 
answers to these questions mirrored the responses given in the context of TAARs. 
As above, a majority of respondents (19) welcomed an improved clearance regime; 
most of these respondents felt that an effective clearance mechanism would critical to 
the success of PBL. A further seven interviewees felt that clearances are not useful or 
that taxpayers should not have to depend on them. Several respondents, whether or 
not they were supportive of a clearances regime, cautioned that a functioning 
principles-based system would require a significant enhancement to HMRC resources. 
Only eight of the respondents stated that the published guidance is or can be useful to 
them. 16 interviewees said that administrative guidance is either undesirable in 
principle or is not useful in practice. Several of these respondents argued that it is not 
satisfactory to have ‘vague rules’ which are narrowed down by guidance when the 
guidance lacks legal force. A few interviewees said that the government has not 
achieved its aims of improving simplicity and clarity if it makes the legislation shorter 
but then issues ‘reams’ of guidance to explain its meaning. 
4.4 Analysis and Conclusions 
In different ways these interviews both disprove and confirm Bennion’s assertion that 
‘the pragmatic British’ do not welcome statements of principle in their legislation: 
‘They distrust them because they almost invariably have to be qualified by exceptions 
and conditions to fit them for real life. What is the use of a principle that cannot stand 
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on its own?’102 Contrary to that assertion, the interviews indicate that there is 
considerable interest in at least exploring a principles-based approach as a means of 
improving the simplicity of the UK tax system. Most respondents agreed that a 
principles-based approach would further the objectives of simplicity and revenue 
protection. Nevertheless, the interviews confirm Bennion’s assertion when applied to 
specific draft legislation. Most respondents’ enthusiasm for PBL was tempered by 
concerns about the need for certainty/clarity, consistency in application, and 
appreciation of the business perspective. The draft PBL on disguised interest, along 
with its expected application by HMRC, were considered to fail all three of these 
criteria. 
The desire for certainty/clarity in commercial transactions is understandable, yet there 
may be a perhaps unfounded belief that such certainty is best obtained via a traditional 
system of detailed prescriptive legislation. As noted above, the questions regarding 
TAARs revealed that a large majority of the interviewees were exasperated with the 
complexity and unpredictability of current anti-avoidance rules, most asserting that 
this was a phenomenon hindering the competitiveness of the UK economy. The 
prevalence of this opinion strongly suggests that new approaches are needed, possibly 
including a principles-based approach. The authors reiterate that a principle is not 
merely a vague rule; it is ‘something external to the rules which helps one to construe 
the rules and, in consequence, enables the rules to be less detailed’.103 
The desire for consistent application of legislated principles is also fully 
understandable. It is not surprising that changing policy views on the part of Treasury 
and HMRC, reflected in frequent amendments to legislation or in altered application 
of motive-based TAARs, have led some businesses to lack trust in the tax 
administration. Without improving such trust it will be very difficult to gain 
acceptance of a principles-based system, which evidently relies on administrative 
discretion to a greater extent than a system of prescriptive rules. There was at least 
some indication in these interviews that better relationships brought about by the 
Varney Review have improved commercial awareness within HMRC. While this may 
have enhanced taxpayer trust on some level, the interviews suggest that it has not been 
enhanced to the point where all large businesses feel they can trust HMRC to apply 
TAARs and PBL with appropriate focus and restraint, as discussed below. 
Appreciation of the business perspective by the tax authorities is also important, 
although one should be careful to distinguish between appreciating the business 
perspective and agreeing with the business perspective. It is the elected members of 
Parliament, on the advice of Treasury and HMRC, who decide what tax policies to 
pursue and what tax legislation to enact. A reasonably clear, consistently applied 
principle which has been refined through effective consultations, yet which is contrary 
to business profitability, is not necessarily a poor principle. In this regard, two broad 
tax principles which some respondents suggested might be welcomed by the business 
community were: first, consistency of tax computations with consolidated accounts; 
and second, symmetry between payer deductions and recipient income inclusions. Of 
course, principles like this do not appear to be of the same kind as principles 
employed in PBL – they operate at a more fundamental level. The authors expect that 
                                                 
102 FAR Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (3rd edn Butterworths, London 1997) 25, cited in Avery 
Jones (n 86 above) 75. 
103 Avery Jones (n 86 above) 76-77. 
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a policy move towards enacting broad tax principles of this nature would obviate the 
need for a great number of specific tax rules. 
This could be done, however, only if the underlying policy of the tax system was 
coherent. This may be the difficulty in the area of disguised interest in particular and 
more generally. 
5 HMRC / TAXPAYER RELATIONSHIP AND THE FORM 
OF LEGISLATION 
The RRA and the other initiatives to improve the relationship between HMRC and 
large businesses require a common basis of trust to succeed. In fact, one of the main 
drives behind the Varney Review is that of developing such trust. As seen above, trust 
is also crucial for the acceptance and success of TAARs and PBL.  
Given the discretion afforded to HMRC by these two types of legislation, a number of 
interviewees pointed out that companies must trust HMRC to apply TAARs and PBL 
sensibly and with appropriate restraint. Some interviewees said that whilst the 
relationship between the two has generally improved in recent times due to the 
initiatives undertaken under the Varney Review, it might still not have reached the 
stage were companies trust HMRC to apply such legislation in this manner. This may 
help to explain some of the negative feedback on the proposed principles-based 
legislation. 
Whilst a relationship based on trust is thus clearly a necessary condition for the 
successful adoption of certain types of legislation, there could be potential difficulties 
and dangers in fostering it. One interviewee suggested that HMRC might apply 
TAARs or PBL more restrictively for low risk companies than for high risk ones.  
HMRC might be more willing to believe, or even assume, that there is a valid 
commercial reason behind a transaction thus bringing it outside the scope of a TAAR 
if it is carried out by a low rather than a high risk company. One interviewee’s 
impression, for example, is that HMRC will only raise TAARs ‘if you are in that 
space’.  
HMRC’s December 2007 Guidance could be interpreted as supporting this belief 
since the list of benefits of being low risk includes the following: 
We will normally assume, unless it is clearly not so, that the customer’s 
judgment will match ours – although this may not be the case for transactions 
involving innovative tax planning or avoidance. 
We will assume that lower tax outcomes have been chosen from a range of 
outcomes for valid reasons.104 
If these are listed as benefits of being low risk, it would seem to follow that HMRC 
will not make the same assumptions for higher risk taxpayers. It seems that they 
would also scrutinize the accounts less thoroughly. This approach follows naturally 
from the risk rating process. A company will only be rated as low risk on the 
                                                 
104 December 2007 Guidance (n 10 above) p 14. 
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understanding that it will disclose any transaction on which there was any question of 
a TAAR applying and discuss it with its CRM.  On the other hand, a company rated as 
low risk which genuinely believes that a transaction does not fall within a TAAR 
could end up being treated with more lenience that a higher risk company entering 
into a very similar transaction for very similar reasons but subjected to intensive 
scrutiny. There could be quite a thin line between sensible allocation of investigative 
resources and fairness in treatment and this is something which will need to be 
monitored if it is not to give grounds for concern. 
HMRC’s December 2007 Guidance could also be interpreted as supporting this view 
by including the following amongst the benefits of being low risk: 
We will assume that we will be told about significant new tax issues; we will 
not ask questions to test disclosure unless it is very clear that these have not 
been brought to our attention. 
Again, whilst understandable, if care is not taken this approach could raise serious 
issues of fairness and equality of taxpayers.  
Whilst the importance of building a relationship based on trust is unquestionable, and 
the steps taken to achieve it thus far should be recognised, these two small points 
serve as a reminder of the difficulties and dangers that might lie ahead.  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the Main Survey suggest that the implementation of the Varney Review 
is having a positive effect in improving the relationship between HMRC and large 
businesses and that the procedure is one that is worth rolling out beyond the taxpayers 
currently covered by the LBS. Valuable developments have taken place since 
completion of the Pilot Survey. Risk rating is more clearly seen to be related to 
behavioural rather than structural factors but there is still a fundamental belief 
amongst some companies that their level of inherent complexity is a barrier to a low 
rating. If this is not the case then the relationship between the structural and 
behavioural factors in risk rating could usefully be expressed even more clearly and 
prominently in HMRC documentation. 
To the extent that behaviour relates to transparency and disclosure, it is widely 
considered by interviewees that these are positive and attainable objectives. The 
sticking point for some comes with altering their tax planning behaviour. In their 
view, the potential benefits of a low risk rating do not outweigh the value of being 
able to use all legal methods at their disposal, including those which HMRC would 
consider aggressive, to attempt to minimize tax costs. Indeed, some consider it 
unreasonable that there should be any disadvantage in acting within the law, even if 
the result is one HMRC dislikes. It does not seem that the risk rating approach alone 
will result in behavioural change in this group of companies. The disclosure regime 
seems to have had considerably more effect in modifying the behaviour of this group 
to the extent that it affects the economics of tax planning. 
The CRM is crucial to the success of the Varney Review. Investment in recruitment, 
retention and training of good CRMs with the ability to understand the needs of large 
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business without becoming ‘captured’ (in the sense of identifying too strongly with 
their customers) is important. 
New approaches to drafting legislation are seen to rely on a trust relationship. The 
ease with which complex anti-avoidance legislation is managed by HMRC and the 
corporate taxpayer alike will be dependent on that relationship, therefore, whatever 
form of anti-avoidance legislation is adopted. The belief that specific legislation will 
provide total certainty may be spurious, in the light of previous experience, and this as 
recognised by some of the interviewees. Despite support for the idea of PBL in 
theory, however, when it came to draft legislation and to actual TAARS, many 
interviewees perceived considerable problems. There was reluctance from many 
interviewees to move towards very broad forms of legislation or to embrace motive-
based tests. It was clear from the discussion of the scenarios that different 
interviewees interpreted behaviour in very different ways and had genuine and 
arguable rationales for their interpretations in many cases. 
Interviewees were more likely to be comfortable with TAARs if they had a low risk 
rating but this did not seem to hold for PBL. Even though the new relationship with 
business is having some success and is well worth pursuing, it is not a substitute for 
getting the legislation right in the first place. The reservations expressed about 
clearances and, even more so, HMRC guidance by many interviewees underline this 
conclusion. There is a dislike of the use of legislation which catches commercial 
transactions so that the taxpayer has to rely on ‘untaxing by concession’. The work 
that has been done on improving resource allocation, speed of settlement, and trust 
generally between HMRC and large taxpayers is to be applauded but the problem of 
drawing the line between tax planning and tax avoidance (in the pejorative sense) 
remains one to be solved by the legislators and the courts. 
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APPENDIX I 
SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
As noted in the introduction, this paper is based on a survey of tax directors from 30 
companies carried out in April-June 2008. This survey follows and builds on a Pilot 
Survey carried out in April-May 2007. For the Pilot Survey, a letter was sent to the 
Hundred Group and interviews were carried out with tax directors from the 9 
companies which volunteered. For the current project, the authors interviewed tax 
directors from 8 of those 9 companies,105 21 other companies selected randomly from 
the FTSE 350 list, and one further company. In all 19 companies from the FTSE 100, 
10 from the FTSE 250 and one unlisted company were interviewed.106 One high level 
LBS official was interviewed in order to check and clarify some points of fact and 
obtain a balancing view.  
The survey was carried out by means of in-depth interviews of about one hour 
conducted by two of the present authors. There was an interview schedule, but the 
interviews were not highly structured, allowing the interviewees to focus on matters 
of importance to their companies. This flexibility allowed the interviewers to steer the 
interviews away from broad generalizations to a more meaningful and concrete 
exchange. It also facilitated the attainment of a satisfactory depth of discussion. On 
the other hand, it meant that not all issues were discussed for the same length of time 
and in the same amount of detail with all interviewees.  
One further feature of the interviews was that the questions asked, and the issues 
discussed, often did not lend themselves to an easy ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. This again 
led to very engaging and profound discussions. On the other hand, it meant that some 
interviewees did not always provide direct answers to the questions asked. These 
interviewees, at times, responded by providing examples, recounting an anecdote, 
speculating on what the general view of tax directors was, or making a broad, 
generalized point. In the light of all this, the authors note the difficulty at times 
encountered in determining the exact view of an interviewee on a particular issue for 
the purposes of this paper. The authors have erred on the side of caution, by, for 
example, not inferring any specific views to the interviewees unless this was clearly 
and incontrovertibly implied in the answers given. If an interviewee’s answers only 
seem to provide vague support for a view, then that is what is stated.  
Therefore, whilst the authors attempted to put order to the answers given, to aggregate 
views, and to draw out some main and subsidiary themes, this research remains very 
much of a qualitative and not a quantitative nature.  
                                                 
105 One of the nine companies was unable to participate this year.  
106 27 of the companies interviewed are dealt with by the LBS. Out of the remaining 3 companies, 2 
have been informed that they will be moved into the LBS soon. One of the 27 companies in the LBS at 
the time of the interview had been informed that it is being moved out.  
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APPENDIX II 
SCENARIOS 
1. Preferred Share Investment Arrangement 
The Taxpayer is a plc resident in the UK. It is the ultimate parent of a group of 
companies operating in several jurisdictions (the ‘Group’). The Taxpayer wholly 
owns, directly or indirectly, a holding company known as ‘ACo’ which is resident in 
the UK. ACo owns shares in a number of operating companies (‘OpCos’) that are 
resident in various jurisdictions where they carry on business. Some of the OpCos 
have recently distributed profits to ACo such that ACo has cash on hand in excess of 
its current requirements. ACo is considering various opportunities for investing 
these funds, either in other operating companies within the Group, or in some other 
company that is not a part of the Group. One candidate for investment is BCo, an 
unconnected private company which is resident in the UK. The relevant companies 
are shown in the following diagram: 
Taxpayer 
 
The Taxpayer and ACo have identified BCo as an attractive investment for a variety 
of reasons. First, BCo carries on a business which is complementary to, but not in 
competition with, the Group’s businesses. Next, although BCo has sustained losses in 
the last few years it is expected to become profitable in the near future. Third, as BCo 
has tax losses carried forward it is indifferent between paying dividends on equity 
financing and paying interest on debt financing – thus BCo is willing to offer a 
preferred share dividend which exceeds what comparable companies might offer 
and which approaches a commercial interest rate. The Taxpayer’s Group Treasurer 
has considered the credit rating of BCo and has confirmed that an investment in BCo 
would be within the normal risk parameters approved by the Board. 
(plc) 
ACo 
OpCo OpCo OpCo 
100% (direct or indirect) 
UK 
BCo 
Investment 
Offshore 
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The specifics of the investment are that BCo will issue to ACo a block of preference 
shares which by their terms are cumulative, redeemable, and carry a fixed rate 
dividend of 5 per cent. The preference shares do not mandate redemption but are 
redeemable at BCo’s option at least one year after issue. BCo may issue some of the 
preferred shares to other investors but the shares will not be widely held (ACo will 
own more than 10 per cent of the issue). 
The Taxpayer’s advisers take the view that neither the current loan relationships 
rules nor the proposed ‘disguised interest’ rules would apply so as to treat the 
dividends received by ACo on the BCo preference shares as taxable income. 
First, the Taxpayer’s advisers are of the opinion that the BCo preference shares are 
not ‘non-qualifying shares’ for purposes of sections 91B through 91E of FA 1996 
(as amended). They opine that, although the return on the preferred shares will be 
broadly equivalent to the return on a commercial loan, the shares are not ‘designed to 
produce’ such a return, and in any event, the shares are ‘excepted shares’ because 
ACo’s purpose in acquiring the shares is not a ‘tax avoidance purpose’ or other 
‘unallowable purpose’. Therefore section 91D should not apply so as to treat the BCo 
shares as a creditor loan relationship in the hands of ACo. 
Second, the Taxpayer’s advisers are similarly of the opinion that the proposed 
principles-based rules regarding ‘disguised interest’ should not apply so as to 
require an income inclusion by ACo (or by the Taxpayer) as a result of the BCo 
investment. They believe that this arrangement falls outside the stated purpose of 
those rules, which is ‘to secure that … a return designed to be economically 
equivalent to interest is treated in the same way as interest for the purposes of 
corporation tax’. Specifically, the Taxpayer’s advisers take the view that the 
investment in BCo is not ‘an arrangement designed to produce a tax privileged 
investment return’ because it is not reasonable to assume that that it was the main 
purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangement to obtain such a return. 
The Taxpayer’s advisers have noted, however, that HMRC appears to disagree with 
this view. Both the HMRC Corporate Finance Manual107 and the recent consultation 
document108 assert that an investment in cumulative redeemable preferred shares, 
where the issuer is in a loss position and the dividend rate is broadly similar to the 
commercial interest rate, is captured by the legislation because the arrangement is 
motivated by tax avoidance. 
                                                 
107 CFM 6320, availabe at <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/cfmmanual/CFM6320.htm>. 
108 HMT and HMRC, Principles-based approach to financial products avoidance: a consultation 
document (December 2007), available at <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/legislation/disguised-interest-
intro.htm>. 
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2. Share Consolidation Arrangement 
A. The Taxpayer is a plc resident in the UK. It is the ultimate parent of a group of 
companies operating in the UK and several other jurisdictions (the ‘Group’). Among 
other companies, the Taxpayer wholly owns three holding companies known as 
‘XCo’ ‘YCo’ and ‘ZCo’, each of which is resident in the UK. XCo holds shares in 
various operating companies within the Group and also holds a portfolio of shares in 
unconnected companies. YCo only holds shares in operating companies within the 
Group. ZCo only holds portfolio investments in unconnected companies. The relevant 
companies are shown in the following diagram: 
UK 
Taxpayer 
(plc) 
 
As part of a rationalisation of the Group’s structure, the Taxpayer wishes to sell 
certain shareholdings to third parties and to consolidate its remaining 
shareholdings within YCo and ZCo. One aspect of the planned reorganisation is to 
have YCo hold all shares in operating companies within the Group and to have ZCo 
hold any remaining portfolio investments in unconnected companies. Accordingly, the 
Taxpayer would like to transfer XCo’s assets (primarily shares in other companies) 
such that: (1) YCo will acquire any shares in operating companies within the Group 
previously held by XCo; and (2) third party purchasers and ZCo will acquire any 
portfolio investments previously held by XCo. XCo may subsequently be wound up. 
Among other gains and losses, XCo realizes a chargeable gain on a disposition of 
certain portfolio shares (in G plc) to an unconnected third party ‘P’. XCo also sells a 
block of shares (in L plc), which are standing at a loss, to P, expecting to realize a 
capital loss which can be set against the chargeable gain arising from the G plc shares. 
A contract negotiated among the Taxpayer, XCo, ZCo and P specifies that ZCo has 
the right to require P to sell the L plc shares to ZCo for their market value within 60 
days, provided that the market value has not risen or fallen by more than 3 per cent. 
After 40 days ZCo exercises this right and buys the L plc shares from P. 
XCo ZCo 
P (Purchaser) 
100% 
YCo 
OpCo + Portfolio 
Holdings (incl. 
G plc and L plc) 
Portfolio 
Holdings 
  OpCo 
Holdings 
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The Taxpayer’s advisers take the view that the loss arising on the disposal of the L plc 
shares by XCo is an ‘allowable loss’ and as such can be set off against chargeable 
gains to reduce XCo’s liability to capital gains tax. In particular, they are of the 
opinion that the loss is not subject to the ‘restrictions on allowable losses’ TAAR in 
section 16A of the TCGA 1992. Although it is true that the loss accrues to XCo in 
consequence of or in connection with an ‘arrangement’ broadly construed, the 
advisers believe that it was not the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of 
the arrangement to secure a tax advantage. The Taxpayer’s advisers have noted, 
however, that the HMRC guidance with respect to ‘contrived losses’ suggests that the 
loss on the L plc shares may be restricted. 
 
B. Please consider a modification of the above scenario where ZCo does not 
exercise its right to buy the L plc shares from P within 60 days, either because the 
market value of the L plc shares has varied by an additional 5 per cent or because ZCo 
simply decides it is not interested in acquiring those shares. 
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